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Resumé
Post-Conditionality in Bulgaria
- an institutional analysis of the absence of judicial reform
I 2007 blev Bulgarien optaget som medlem af EU på tods af, at landet endnu
ikke havde gennemført de nødvendige reformer af det juridiske system, og dermed
ikke levede op til EU’s adgangskriterier. Som noget nyt valgte EU for første gang
at indføre en kontrolinstans til at monitorere udvilklingen af Bulgariens reform-
proces og tilstræbelser på at opfylde EU’s krav - kontrolinstansen gav EU mu-
lighed for at suspendere en række tilskud. I kølvandet på en række korruption-
sskandaler involverende EU midler blev suspensionsmulighederne effektureret
i 2008, da Commission ikke fandt Bulgariens bestræbelser tilstrækkelige. Dette
speciale vil gennem et casestudie undersøge de bagvedliggende grunde til de
manglende reformer. Ved brug af en europæiseringsteoretisk top-down analy-
seramme, og ved at trække på begreber fra nyinstitutionalismen, vil vi i specialet
analysere effekten af EU’s pres på Bulgarien, ’misfittet‘ mellem EU’s kriterier og
det faktiske billede i Bulgarien, samt de medierende faktorer i det politiske og ju-
ridiske system. Vi finder problemer med effekten af EU’s tiltag. Disse fremstår
som utroværdige og de tildelte ressourcer fokuserer på politikker frem for op-
bygning af institutionel kapacitet. Desuden er de fremsatte benchmark svært op-
erationaliserbare og mangler målbare målsætninger. Derudover finder vi, at Bul-
gariens kommunistiske arv har bevirket, at en reformprocess har haft svært ved
at slå rod, bl.a fordi det juridiske system i store træk forblev intakt efter 1989. Det
politiske miljø er præget af ustabilitet med ofte skiftende mindretalsregeringer,
hvilket har resulteret i mangel på langsigtede reformtiltag. Endvidere er relation-
erne mellem den juridiske og udøvende magt problematiske, hvilket er et resul-
tat af en uforholdsmæssig stor juridisk uafhængighed. Denne uafhængighed har
givet vetospillere, i form af den bulgarske forfatningsdomstol og det juriske råd,
magt til at bremse reformer og, pga. interne stridigheder mellem dommerne og
anklagemyndigheden samt disses immunitet, har det juridiske system ikke inter-
esse i at drive reformprocessen selv.
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1Introduction
In 1989, the fall of the Berlin wall marked the ending of the Cold War and a divided
Europe. Many Central- and Eastern European countries announced themselves ready
to reform and declared a wish for membership of the European Union (EU). The EU
likewise was eager to expand the internal market and reunite Europe before the other
’suitor’, Russia, could gain too much ground and influence. A few years later, in the
early 1990s, ten former Soviet countries and the EU began negotiations (Papadim-
itriou 2001:71, Schimmelfennig 2007b:126). It was a process of democratization which
began, involving everything from market economy, free elections and the building of
an independent judiciary. Earlier enlargements were primarily led by economic in-
centives both for the candidate countries and the EU, but the accession of the post-
Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, brought political transforma-
tion forward (Crombois 2008: 457). The EU wanted to bring the former Soviet states
towards Western standards and democracy, and membership prospects was the in-
centive in use.
Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007 after failing to obtain membership along with the eight
1 other Central- and Eastern European countries in 2004. Despite needing further
action in areas such as the judiciary and the fight against corruption and organized
crime, the country was commended for its commitment to adapting to the so-called
Copenhagen criteria2 , which are the EUs criteria for accession, and deemed ready for
membership;
1Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia all became members of the
European Union in 2004 - as did Cyprus and Malta
2Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protec-
tion of minorities; The existence of a functioning market economy as well as a capacity to cope with competi-
tive pressure and market forces within the Union; The ability to take on the obligations of membership includ-
ing adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (European Commission on enlargement:
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm (last accessed
11.03.10)).
5
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"Bulgaria and Romania have made considerable efforts to complete their prepara-
tions for EU membership since the Commission issued its last report in May. Bulgaria
and Romania are sufficiently prepared to meet the political, economic and acquis cri-
teria by 1 January 2007" (Commission 2006: 12).
Bulgaria’s pre- and post-accession process is unique. It was part of the latest enlarge-
ment round in the EU, an enlargement round which has been different from all previ-
ous rounds; never before have post-accession monitoring and compliance measures
been included in the accession process (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 126). Since the
accession, development has not gone as planned. Recent reports show that change of
the judicial system has been slow, and in some instances nonexistent. The Commis-
sion’s report from 2008 on monitoring progress in Bulgaria, concludes that change has
happened but that the change has mostly been on a technical level and has had lim-
ited impact - "[...] the laws have to be implemented and the institutions have to work
effectively to produce more concrete results" (Commission 2008b:3). The report also
points out that a broader political consensus is needed to impose the necessary re-
forms. The Commission’s report from July 2009 points to similar problems; "[Eˇ] steps
are confined to the technical level and have limited impact" (Commission 2009:7).
The EU does not stand alone in its criticism, the Bulgarian public lacks trust in the
judiciary - only 14 pct. of the Bulgarian public have trust in their judiciary (Euro-
barometer 2009b:73). Furthermore, the judiciary is perceived to be the most corrupt
sector (Transparency International 2009:30). The message is thus clear from the pub-
lic as well as the EU; reform is needed and to back this up the EU Commission has
taken serious measures in use in order to pressure Bulgaria resulting in large amounts
of funds being withheld (Trauner 2009: 19, Crombois 2008:456).
The question is then, what is preventing Bulgaria from having a fully reformed judicial
system? A well functioning judicial system is one of the fundamental building blocks
of a democratic society based on the separation of powers and is key if other prob-
lems, like corruption and organized crime, are to be fought and prevented. On the
face of it, Bulgaria has had every chance at succeeding. Millions of Euros3 and tech-
nical assistance from e.g. the American Bar Association (American Bar Association
2006) have been injected into the cause, but still, significant results are not evident.
In this thesis we are intrigued by the causes for the lack of change in Bulgaria. What
is keeping Bulgaria from truly reforming the judicial system? It has now been over
a decade since Bulgaria initiated negotiations and reforms for EU accession. Chang-
ing governments have shown willingness and produced several strategies to foster de-
velopment - yet fundamental change is still needed. Public opinion has throughout
the process been supportive of EU membership and the fight against corruption and
organized crime (Eurobarometer 2009:91-93). The yearly reports from the EU Com-
mission consistently point to three areas of special concern - the judicial system, or-
3EU Press release (23.07.08), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/522format
=HTMLaged=0language=EN (last accessed 22.04.10).
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Box 1: The elements of the Bulgarian Judiciary (World Bank 2008:11)
• The Supreme Court of Cassation (SCC) exercises supreme judicial
supervision of how the law is applied by all courts
• The Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) exercises supreme judicial
supervision over the administrative justice and appeals and protestations against acts
of the Council of Ministers as well as individual ministers and other legal acts.
• Courts of appeal
• Courts of assizes
• Martial Courts
• District Courts
• The Prosecutors Office make sure that legality is observed by:
- bringing charges against criminal suspects and supporting such charges in criminal trials;
- overseeing the enforcement of penalties and other measures of compulsion;
- initiating the rescinding of illegitimate acts;
- participating in civil and administrative suits whenever required to do so by law
• The investigators have the task of performing the preliminary investigation in
criminal cases
• The Constitutional Court
ganized crime and the fight against corruption. The EU seems torn between how to
react. Sanctions, surveillance mechanisms and administrative and technical support
are all tools in use but these do not seem to suffice. Seemingly, Bulgaria has had every
opportunity and incentive to comply with EU demands, so far without success. This
leads us to the following question.
1.1 Research Question
"Why has Bulgaria not been able to live up to the EUs accession criteria?"
The areas in which Bulgaria has experienced severe and continued criticism are cor-
ruption, organized crime and the judiciary. Empirically and analytically the subjects
are closely interconnected - e.g. one of the biggest problems in the judiciary is corrup-
tion and the lack of convictions against perpetrators, often connected to organized
crime. Therefore our focus will be on the judicial system in Bulgaria.
Moreover, our focus on the judiciary is influenced by the central role it plays in soci-
ety; along with the legislature and the executive, it is part of the trias politica, which
is central to most democracies and an integrated part of the governing of a coun-
try. Without a functioning judiciary, the government’s legitimacy and value is lost in
a democratic Bulgaria and hopes of fighting corruption and organized crime will be
futile. In addition, the positive development in other areas of society will risk being
lost without reforms in the judiciary. We therefore see this as a vital area, which could
potentially determine the future for Bulgaria.
Through a case study approach we wish to understand the reasons behind the lack of
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reform in the judiciary. Europeanization theory deals with domestic institutional and
policy change in the EUs neighboring countries and member states - who’s change is
generated by ’Europe’ (Bauer et al. 2007:406). This provides an analytical framework
allowing us to investigate EU pressure and Bulgaria’s response to this. We will apply
a strict top down approach drawing on rational choice institutionalism and sociolog-
ical institutionalism providing mechanism to understand the dynamics in play. This
will be supplemented by historical institutionalism in order to provide analytical con-
cepts for understanding how Bulgaria past might be influencing the progress of the
reform process. We find that inertia has been the main characteristic of the judiciary’s
response to reform demands, due to the existence of non-accountable governance
structures, as well as a number of veto players in key implementation positions, who
will not benefit, from increased transparency and compliance resulting from effective
and efficient policy implementation. Instead they stand to lose power and influence.
Furthermore, the EU resources focusing on the rule of law have been few and badly
managed, focusing on policy over institutional reform. This strategy has failed to re-
duce the high number of veto players in the judiciary. Because of the absence of mea-
sures to preclude non compliance other than the safety clauses, veto players, both in
the judiciary as well as the legislative, seem to have been empowered on the expense
of the public society, which favors European integration.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
After presenting our area of research and our research question we will now introduce
the outline of the remaining thesis. The aim is to create an overview of the different
chapters and guide our reader through our layout.
Chapter 2 of deals with our methodological choices. A literature review will outline
the ontological outset of our theoretical framework. Theoretically we have chosen to
combine institutional approaches, which have quite different ontologies, and there-
fore the implications of this will be discussed. Furthermore, we will present our case-
study approach and the empirical data we have chosen for conducting our analysis.
Chapter 3 presents our theoretical framework. Europeanization theory and institu-
tional theory will aid us in explaining processes of change and stability in connection
to EU membership, through the concepts of misfit, conditionality and mediating fac-
tors. Historical institutionalism will supplement our Europeanization theory, by pro-
viding the concepts of path dependency and increasing returns, with which we can
analyze previous events’ influence on the current processes. Furthermore, it can pro-
vide concepts to understand how endogenous change can create the foundation for
more fundamental change.
Chapter 4 is our research strategy. After presenting and identifying the relevant theo-
retical concepts in the former chapter, we will clarify how we will apply the analytical
concepts from the theory to our empirical findings. The aim is to construct a research
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strategy which will guide our analysis and aid us in answering our research question.
Chapter 5 of the thesis contains our three-part analysis. We will begin by identifying
the Europeanization process and analyze the pressure, which the EU is exerting on
Bulgaria through political instruments like aid, sanctions, and twinning. The second
part of the analysis will establish which areas are characterized by a misfit between
EU requirements and the domestic level. Finally, we will turn our focus to the domes-
tic level. Through investigation of the institutional legacies and mediating factors, we
will determine what is hindering or assisting domestic change.
Chapter 6 is a compilation of our conclusions as well as critical reflections. The find-
ings we have made in the analysis will be collected, and we will reflect on and discuss
the methodological and theoretical choices we have made throughout the thesis, and
the implications these have had on our conclusions. Furthermore, we will discuss
the usefulness of our theoretical concepts and to what extent our choice of data has
helped us in applying these.
2Methodology
The object of this chapter is to understand the theoretical and methodological choices we have
made. We have chosen an institutional approach to our case study but we combine institu-
tional approaches which have diverse ontologies. We do this by combining Europeanization
theory and historical institutionalism in an attempt to explain and examine best possible the
mechanisms which are either hindering, or helping to further accelerate the reform process in
Bulgaria.
2.1 Literature review
Institutional theory does not originate from EU studies but reflects a gradual re-intro-
duction of institutions into International Relations (IR) theory. The introduction of
rational choice institutionalism in IR theory was a reaction to neofunctionalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism. The first was criticized for its lack of micro foundations,
and the latter for its minimalist account of EU institutions.
Pollack revises the actual IR field. He argues that realist, liberal, and rational choice in-
stitutional approaches, which are originally seen as competing theories show signs of
convergence around a single rationalist model. This is a model, which assumes fixed
preferences and rational behavior among actors in the EU. Instead, he argues that
constructivism remains as the primary rivaling approach in European integration. So-
ciological institutionalism forms part of the constructivist counterpart in IR theory,
focusing on how institutional norms are diffused and legitimized in both domestic
and international politics (Pollack 2000: 6-7). Pollack criticizes what he calls a ten-
dency among constructivists to assume certain ontologies, such as identity and pref-
erence change. His point is that constructivists fail to construct distinctive testable
hypotheses, but instead opt for broad interpretive frameworks that can make sense of
almost everything, and if they create hypotheses which are falsifiable, they do not em-
ploy methods capable of distinguishing predicted outcomes from those predicted by
rationalist hypotheses. Constructivists respond by stating that Moravcsik privileges
10
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rationalist explanations and sets a higher empirical standard for constructivists. Af-
ter all, rationalists typically don’t make an effort to demonstrate that preferences are
exogenously given, and not shaped by institutions (Pollack 2000: 14-17).
"If constructivism and rationalism are indeed emerging as the defining poles of both
international relations and EU studies, and if these two approaches begin with funda-
mentally different assumptions or "ontologies" about the nature of agency and social
interaction, then it seems to me we must necessarily fall back on careful, empirical test-
ing of rationalist and constructivist hypotheses as the ultimate, and indeed the only,
standard of what constitutes "good work", and what constitutes support for one or the
other approach" (Pollack 2000: 17).
This is a dispute and discussion which has continued and is ongoing within the in-
stitutionalism research community, and which we will bring up later in this chap-
ter. Institutionalism in integration studies dates back to the reintroduction of institu-
tionalism in political science in the mid 80s and coincided with the pioneering piece
of March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions from 1989 (Aspinwall 2000: 2). The
EUs scope and depth has grown vast, and the EU is more and more reminiscent of
a domestic polity in the way it implicates and exhibits authority over its constituent
member states. Wallace characterizes the EU as "less than a federation, more than a
regime" (Wallace 1983). This describes the problematic ontology of the EU quite well.
Should the EU be analyzed through an IR toolkit, and be seen as a functional transac-
tion cost regime, or is there more to the story?
The EUs uniqueness has lead EU students to take up insights from the new institu-
tionalisms in political science. This also reflects a broader trend in political science.
What matters is that politics occur within an institutional context, a framework of
mutually understood principles, norms, rules and procedures (Jupille and Caporaso
1999: 429-430).
2.1.1 Europeanization now and then
Europeanization, as it is used today, is a fairly new term in the social and political
sciences. But understood as "the extension of the European state system out side its
core area", Europeanization goes all the way back to the 16th century or even earlier
(Mjøset 1997).
Historians have used Europeanization in referring to the transfer of European author-
ity and social norms during the many colonial adventures by France, Britain, Spain,
Portugal and the Netherlands. Anthropologists have used the term to describe the dif-
ferent identities and interests and their change within geographical Europe, and sci-
entists researching religious affiliations have also made use of Europeanization (Feath-
erstone 2003:6). Another use of Europeanization as a historic phenomenon is more
recent and refers to the adaptation to West European norms and practices - i.e. the
norms and practices of "the major powers of the region" (Featherstone 2003:7).
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Furthermore, Europeanization has been used in relation to ’transnational cultural dif-
fusion’. In these cases, the term can be used to describe anything from altered drink-
ing habits in Iceland to the "cultural assimilation of European-based notions of hu-
man rights and citizenship by Turkish immigrants in Germany" (Featherstone 2003:7).
The scope of Europeanization is ever developing and is now also used to describe and
explain changes in neighboring states and prospected members (Bauer et al. 2007:406).
The idea is that countries trying to obtain membership adjust their rules and even
norms in order to prove adherence to accession requirements. Even countries that
have no prospect of becoming members of the EU may choose to follow certain parts
of the acquis, e.g. minimum requirements in agriculture, in order to gain access to the
internal market (Bauer et al. 2007).
As an aside it can be mentioned that Europeanization is widely used in connection to
the EUs foreign- and development policies. Through certain criteria, which develop-
ing countries must fulfill in order to receive aid and assistance, the EU is promoting
and encouraging European norms and values (Council of the European Union 2005).
Today, Europeanization is mostly used in association with domestic adaptation to the
pressures stemming from EU membership, either directly or indirectly (Featherstone
2003:7), and it is within this scope this project lies.
2.1.2 Europeanization and European Integration
Europeanization is not European integration - the two concepts are, however, linked
and Europeanization could not exist without European integration. European Inte-
gration is concerned with the topic of "why do different countries join forces and build
up supranational institutions" (Radaelli 2003: 33), and with whether the EU strength-
ens the state or weakens it. Europeanization poses more concrete questions such as
the role of domestic institutions in the process of adaptation to the EU. Europeaniza-
tion is concerned with "what happens when EU institutions are in place and produce
their effects" (Radaelli 2003: 33). Though Europeanization and European Integration
are interconnected, the two should be kept apart at the conceptual and analytical
level. European Integration describes the process of bargaining, conflict interaction
between national, sub national and EU level actors. The outcomes of Europeanization
can feed back to the European Integration process, as national actors learn from Euro-
peanization and seek to change EU policy. Therefore one could view Europeanization
as cyclical or a two way process. None the less, it is important to distinguish between
the process leading to formation of a policy, i.e. European Integration, and the effects
of these on domestic structures, institutions, ideas, etc., i.e. Europeanization (Radaelli
2003:33-34).
2.1.3 New Institutionalism
Institutions are central to the world we live in. Institutions make the frame for hu-
man beings for how to act and react in all aspects of our lives. There are, however,
differences in the way the different institutional schools see the value and function of
institutions - still, in all theories institutions build the structure for human behaviour
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(Steinmo 2007:9-19).
Institutionalism is a very old school. Steinmo writes that as long as people have been
studying politics, the theory of institutionalism has existed. Plato, Aristotle, Locke
and Hobbes all wrote about institutions and how institutions affect human behaviour,
especially in the field of politics (Steinmo 2007:2). These old institutional studies
deal with formal rules in the political world. They analysed "political, administra-
tive, and legal arrangements" (Schmidt 2005:2) and were generally comparative stud-
ies (Schmidt 2005:2).
The new institutionalism, declares itself an answer to the behavioural theories of the
1960s and 1970s (Hall and Taylor 2007:169). Like the behaviourists, the institution-
alists apprehend their theory as a possibility to work in a broad empirical field with
many empirical problems (Immergut 1997:326). Institutionalists seek to explain real
world outcomes (Steinmo 2007:6). An important question in the development of in-
stitutionalism is why the outcomes in the world differ from each other, and what is
exactly meant with the term ’institution’?
Different definitions about institutions exist. However, Steinmo points out that the
most usual definition is ’rules’. While some institutionalists understand rules as "for-
mal rules and organizations", other institutionalists talk of "informal rules and norms"
(Steinmo 2007:7). This definition implicates that institutions are unique, because
there are no institutions, which have the exact same rules (Steinmo 2007:4). Hall and
Taylor have another broad definition of institutions: institutions are "the formal or in-
formal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity or political economy" (Hall and Taylor 2007:171).
As explained in the introduction to this thesis, our project is focused on the lack of re-
form in the Bulgarian judicial system. The EU’s response to this has been to sanction
and put continuous focus on this problem through reports and by taking administra-
tive and advisory steps in assisting Bulgaria. The EU has developed accession criteria
which each aspiring member has had to live up to. But the responses to these criteria
have been very diverse from country to country. This can be explained by the di-
verse institutional settings of each country, and is exactly the core of Europeanization
theory - EU pressure doesn’t necessarily lead to convergence but can lead to many
different outcomes, depending on the specific condition of each case. This is why we
have chosen Europeanization theory, because it provides concepts and a framework
on EU pressure and the mechanisms which shape the outcome. Furthermore, Euro-
peanization theory combines and develops explanations coming from both rational
choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism.
"National institutions and actors matter in the sense that they have a profound, if not
determining effect on how European integration as a force of polity and politics change
plays out in the domestic context" (Bulmer 2008: 48).
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Institutional theory, institutionalism, plays a central role to Europeanization. Detect-
ing Europeanization implies detecting a change or transformation and this change
takes place in institutions and is shaped by these.
2.1.4 Historical Institutionalism
The old institutionalism, as well as the Marxists and the structural-functionalists, have
had great influence on historical institutionalism and how it was developed; like the
old institutionalists, the historical institutionalists have a focus on the formal institu-
tions; like the Marxists, the historical institutionalists often analyse power and asym-
metrical relationships; and like the structural-functionalists, the historical institution-
alists analyse structures, but not functions. For historical institutionalists "political
action could not be reduced to individual behaviour alone or even to group activity
because of the importance of how the state structured action and how state capacity
and policy legacies structured outcomes" (Schmidt 2005:6). Historical institutional-
ists are interested in the ways history shapes outcomes and not motivated by a desire
to search for general laws. It focuses on explanation and not prediction. The objects
of studying are institutions and human beings and how these are affected by history
itself and change it and adapt to it. Historical institutionalists are interested in spe-
cific cases rather than creating generalizable laws (Steinmo 2008: 127-136).
When viewing the Bulgarian case and trying to analyze the impact of the European
Union, it is impossible not to take into account the history which encompasses Bul-
garia. As our ontology shows, the world is full of institutions and no institutions are
created out of nothing, but arise and develop from other institutions. The Bulgarian
case is a good example of this. The accession criteria are based on a democratic ide-
ology, which is rooted in a long history of western democracies. Bulgaria is a young
democracy, which is still developing its democratic institutions. Many years under
the communist regime and the last decades of extensive corruption have shaped the
existing formal institutions as well as the informal rules of the game. As part of living
up to the accession criteria new institutions have been created. What is interesting is
whether these have become an integral part of old institutions or work as a parallel to
old institutions. Have they changed the ways of doing things, the rules of the game
and the understanding of appropriateness or are they merely empty institutions cre-
ated to satisfy EU demands?
This leads us to a weakness in Europeanization theory. Europeanization theory can
help us understand the pressure of adaptation created by EU policy and the mecha-
nisms, which shape or impede the adaptation process. But Europeanization theory
overemphasizes a synchronic view on the analysis of institutions and offers limited
attention to the insights of dynamics over time, even though it accepts that European
pressure will result in various outcomes from one country to another. This implies
that each country has its own institutional legacy that shapes and constitutes devel-
opment. The rational choice strand of Europeanization theory indirectly incorporates
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a historical element, as it analyses the effects of Europeanization by looking at power
relations, resource distribution between actors, and specific institutional structures,
which are in essence a result of a specific historical development. The Sociological
institutionalist strand of Europeanization has an inherent historical ontological fo-
cus. Socialization processes develop slowly, and it is only possible to explain change
in behavior over long periods of time. But the analytical framework provided by Eu-
ropeanization gains by being supplemented by a diachronic analysis, encapsulating
the dimension of time. This is why HI is a useful theory, because it allows us to view
the evolution of new layers of politics that interact with older ones (Bulmer 2008: 56),
and it introduces the concept of path dependency and asymmetrical power relations.
These concepts provide the tools to understand why institutions are so stable and why
institutional paths can be difficult to change, even though there is a great amount of
pressure from the EU (Bursens 2008: 124-126), by providing an understanding that in-
stitutional adaptation can be difficult because of costs of changing them and because
of long standing habits of doing things.
2.1.5 Combining the three institutionalisms ontologies
Two main divergences in theoretical approaches to European integration can be es-
tablished. The first deals with structure and agency. SI and HI pay particular attention
to the context which shapes policy change, mediates between actors, and alters the
conditions in which decisions are reached. Especially in SI, structure is ontologically
prior to agency. In the rationalist perspective structure matters less. Individuals are
seen to react basically in the same strategic behavior in spite of changing environ-
ments with diverging incentive structures (Aspinwall 2000: 24).
The methodology of historical and sociological institutionalism has been orientated
towards case studies and empirical research. Results are descriptive analyses of cer-
tain events but with little theoretical generalization and quantitative data manipula-
tion. Empirical case studies have the advantage that they are descriptively wealthy
and precise in their explanation of a certain event. The detail, however, may obscure
the importance of casual variables (Aspinwall 2000: 24). The methodology of rational
choice institutionalism is mostly deductive, formal and universalistic. There has been
a tendency not to examine individual cases, which has lead to conflicting findings on
the same events (Aspinwall 2000: 23). This leads to a critique of rational choice for a
lack of empiricism.
All three approaches perceive institutions as constraints and opportunities. They have
no bias toward a specific level of analysis, like intergovernmentalists focusing on grand
bargains. Another possibility is to consider the temporal level of analysis. RCI focuses
primarily on short term bargaining scenarios, HI and SI focus on actor behavior as
influenced by institutions, as a product of evolvement period. Structure constitutes
agents, but it takes time for the structures to evolve. If one was to examine a certain
decision making scenario, it might be possible that actors behave rationally within the
frame of the institutional context. Conversely, rational choice institutionalists may
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find that a certain form of behavior is deemed as legitimate, while another is illegiti-
mate. This can be the long term consequence of repeated interaction, and time tends
to internalize the effects so that agents tend to reflect consciously on the efficiency of
the behavior. Over time, institutions become less sensitive to agent calculation, lead-
ing to a habit driven behavior, rather than self reflective behavior (Aspinwall 2000:
26-27).
What can we make of the apparent methodological pluralism? RCI has strong devel-
oped formal modeling, which forces precision into the argument and in some sense
uncovers the problems of inductive reasoning. On the other hand, HI and SI have a
well developed theoretical model which is less explicit and generalizable. A merger
between theoretical robustness and substantive tests of the hypotheses is the main
advantage of revised institutionalism (Aspinwall 2000: 25).
We choose to apply a pragmatic approach to our case in order to understand it best
possibly. Our aim is not to develop a theoretical model which can be applied to all
case studies, nor hypotheses about causal mechanism at a theoretical level. We seek
to understand best possibly the specific case, and in order to do so, will draw on each
of the explanatory strengths of the three institutionalisms, as we se them as supple-
mentary, rather than competing. Put in other words, it is not a question of either/or,
but both/and (Checkel 2007b: vii). Our principle area of research is the influence of
institutions on outcomes (Aspinwall 2000: 22).
2.2 Criticism of theory
In this section we will discuss some of the weaknesses of our choice of Europeaniza-
tion and new institutionalist approach to our case study.
2.2.1 Europeanization theory
A point of critique in Europeanization theory is how to be able to attribute changes in
Bulgaria to EU pressure. Change can also take place without ’pressure’ from the EU
and this creates a problem of ensuring our findings as attributable to Europeaniza-
tion. The transition period after 1989 included an aim for membership of the WTO
and NATO, as well as the EU. We cannot rule out that some of the reforms, especially
market reforms and the geopolitical turn towards the Western world may, have been
affected by Bulgaria’s applications for membership in these two international orga-
nizations. Overall globalization and the desire for economic development have un-
doubtedly also played a part. However, in our case of the reform of the Bulgarian ju-
dicial system, EU pressure is very clear, because there are very specific EU demands.
Moreover, reform in Bulgaria has been largely depending on the intensity of EU pres-
sure (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008:132), which could indicate that Europeanization
processes are taking place. Radaelli criticizes the scales for domestic change pre-
sented within the Europeanization literature, as the criteria for the different steps of
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the scale are often too vaguely defined, which makes the choice of category depen-
dent on the eyes of the beholder (Radaelli 2003:38). While acknowledging this sub-
jectivity, this project will however, through empirical observations, argue that several
outcomes are present in the reform of the Bulgarian judicial, wherefore the outcome
will not rigidly be following the theoretical paradigm.
2.2.2 Institutionalism, Structure and Agency
One thing the three institutional approaches have in common is that structures, how-
ever defined, do matter. Structures seem to persist and create greater regularity in
human behavior than would otherwise exist (Peters 2000: 13). If we focus too much
on structure, however, we run the risk of "hyperstability" and ignoring agency. Both
institutions and individuals are involved in an ongoing process of interaction that pro-
duces change and sometimes replacement of existing institutions (Peters 2000: 17-
19). Even though it is important to focus on the stability of institutions and their ca-
pacity to explain policies over time, we do not want to dwell on this and thus disregard
the possibilities of change. To prevent this, we introduce several concepts focusing
on the potential of change to better understand their values and incentives, and the
likely effect they will have on policy. Concepts like layering and displacement, de-
rived from historical intuitionalism, focus on the potential for endogenous change of
institutions. Norm entrepreneurs and strategic calculation, derived from sociologi-
cal institutionalism, describe two mechanisms that can lead to socialization of new
norms. Conditionality and differential empowerment of actors, derived from rational
choice intuitionalism, describe how costs and benefit can shift power relations and
provide incentives leading to reform.
Which types of institutions should we focus on?
When attempting to use institutionalism as an organizing theory, some important
empirical problems could occur. We assume that institutions make sense as an ex-
planatory variable but a problem arises when attempting to specify what about them
matters and how they exert their influence. Measurement of institutions and varia-
tion in their characteristics pose a challenge to use the theories in a more systematic
manner (Peters 2000: 9). We believe that Europeanization theory helps us to solve
this problem, by providing an analytical framework and variables to look for in our
analysis.
2.3 The case study approach
This project deals with complex processes, which we will attempt to describe and ex-
plain; the development of an independent government branch in a political system
which has undergone multiple transitions. We will try to locate the most important
sources of change and influence. For doing this, we have chosen a case study ap-
proach. Case studies are well suited for studying complex research areas, which con-
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sist of many sub analyses (Øivind 2003: 27). It "investigates a contemporary phe-
nomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phe-
nomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin 2003: 13). A typical characteristic
of case studies are that they are process-oriented studies, interpreting change over
time.
Considering the basic research challenge of this case, a predominantly qualitative ap-
proach seems appropriate. Øivind writes that "in qualitative studies, interpretation
and understanding are important concepts, and findings are often legitimized in a
hermeneutic perspective" (Øivind 2003: 28). The aim of our case study is not to pro-
vide a set of statistical data which can enable us to generalize our findings. Rather, we
wish to investigate a complex relation, without any claims of validity for other cases.
2.4 Defining the dependent variable
Implementation of EU accession criteria, or rule adaptation, is not a precise concept,
and can be interpreted in a number of ways, ranging from the formal transposition
of national law, to achieving the ultimate goal, e.g. eroding corruption and organized
crime. The formal conception of implementation is the establishment of formal in-
stitutions and procedures which are in agreement with EU rules or the transposition
of EU rules into national law. The behavioral or practical conception of implementa-
tion, however, relates to whether the actual behavior is ’according to the rules’ (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier 2005:8).
In this case, it would not make much sense to delimit the analysis to formal transpo-
sition of national law, as the research question is closely connected to the actual prac-
tice. This does not mean that the formal transposition is not important and should
not be included, it might be a helping tool in measuring change and EU influence.
However, even if Bulgarian legislation is deemed adequate, a complete evaluation of
the implementation of the accession criteria demands that the formal transposition
and the practical application of institutional and instrumental changes correspond to
the objectives defined in the EU acquis and accession criteria.
2.5 Empirical Data
The empirical data used in this project is derived from material from several sources.
In order to ensure a satisfactory outcome, both quantitative and qualitative data is in-
cluded - as Yin writes; "any finding or conclusion in a case study is likely to be much
more convincing and accurate if it is based on several different sources of informa-
tion, following a corroboratory mode" (Yin 2003:98).
The primary sources of evidence in our project can all be described as documenta-
tion (Yin 2003:85-88) although they vary widely. Administrative documents from the
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World Bank, the United Nations (UN), and the European Union like progress and sta-
tus reports, are used to evaluate the progress made in Bulgaria. The advantages of
using these reports are that they are stable and easily accessible but it is important
to keep in mind that they are produced by a subjective part and have been edited by
both the EU and Bulgaria. News articles also play an important part of our empirical
data. They are current and in most cases exact in referring to names and details of
an event. They can, however, also have a strong political bias and be reliant on fund-
ing from interests in the case. We primarily use Sofia News Agency (Novinite), which
is the largest English-language news provider in Bulgaria and read by international
businesses as well as diplomats in foreign embassies in Sofia. The articles are used
for documenting events and reflecting public interest, never as a stand alone assessor
of reform. Finally, we make use of other authors’ empirical findings and conclusions.
Their data, amongst other, includes both interviews (Bohzhilova 2008, and Melone
1996), and quantitative research (Trauner 2009, and Nikolova 2007). The obvious risk
of using ’second-hand’ empirical findings is that they are produced for a purpose and
perhaps audience, which differ from ours. Moreover, we do not know how the data
has been addressed and the authors may have motives (political, economic or ideo-
logical) for making particular conclusions.
Besides documentation, we also make use of archival records (Yin 2003:89). These
consist of quantitative survey data collected by Eurobarometer and Transparency In-
ternational. Both surveys are based on face-to-face or telephone interviews, resulting
in quantitative data. The advantage of this type of empirical data is that it is precise,
easily accessible, and the findings are comparable to previous years, making it possi-
ble to draw in a development theme. The disadvantages, however, are that the surveys
may not be fully representative or reflect an increased perception (perhaps due to in-
creased media focus), rather than an actual increase, as the representative sample
is subjective. We believe that the surveys are an important addition to our empirical
data because they represent the view of the public and thereby supply a layman’s view
of complex problems. Transposition data from the Commission is also used to give a
simple quantitative ’measure’ of formal implementation.
3Theoretical framework
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the field of Europeanization and new institution-
alism. As we have presented in the previous chapter, Europeanization theory will be used in
collaboration with historical institutionalism in analyzing our empirical findings.
Europeanization theory enables us in explaining processes of change and stability in connection
to membership of the EU. The theoretical concepts allow us to understand the pressure the EU is
putting on the member states and candidate countries, as well as understand how the pressure
is channeled internally in the member states. Historical institutionalism will supplement our
Europeanization theory, by analyzing previous events’ influence on the current processes. Fur-
thermore, it will provide concepts to understand how small changes, which initially might be
overlooked by Europeanization theory, can create the foundation for more fundamental change.
3.1 Defining Europeanization
As mentioned above, there have been several definitions and understandings of Eu-
ropeanization. Risse, Cowles and Caporaso refer to the formation of an EU level gov-
ernance system;
"[T]he emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of
governance, that is of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political
problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks
specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules" (Risse et.al. 2001:3).
This understanding of Europeanization as a bottom-up process is broad and not un-
like European integration. Another definition of Europeanization is presented by Adri-
anne Héritier:
"[T]the process of influence derived from European decisions and impacting member
states’ policies and political and administrative structures" (Héritier 2001: 3).
20
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Héritier understands Europeanization as a top-down process where the domestic pol-
itics and institutions are shaped and transformed by institutions and decisions from
the European level. In short, the bottom-up dimension refers to the uploading and
construction of the EU system, whereas the top-down dimension refers to the down-
loading of member states or the domestic impact (Bulmer 2008: 48). As mentioned
above, in most cases, Europeanization as a bottom-up process is not distinguishable
from the "classical" concept of European integration and we will therefore discard the
approach (Lenschow 2006:57).
A third definition is presented by Radaelli;
"Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ’ways of doing things’, and
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of
EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse,
identities, political structures, and public policies" (Radaelli 2003:30).
With this definition, Radaelli wishes to highlight several points. First of all, change
is very important; Radaelli sees Europeanization as a process of institutionalization
where a "domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics" take place (Radaelli 2003:30).
Secondly, Radaelli has deliberately not mentioned organizations in his definition, as
he believes both organizations and individuals should be included. His definition ap-
plies to member states as well as other countries and covers everything from political
structure to "ideas and the cognitive dimension of politics" (Radaelli 2003:30). Thirdly,
it is important to Radaelli that the definition applies to the making of policy, not only
law-making, as other modes of governance, e.g. the open method of coordination, are
also included (Radaelli 2003:30-31). Radaelli’s definition can be seen as encompassing
both the former definitions "and conceives of Europeanization as both a bottom-up
and a top-down process" (Börzel and Risse 2007: 485).
3.1.1 A top-down or a cyclical process?
Europeanization as a top-down process has the EU as the direct or indirect origin
of developments on the national level, and not as a target of Europeanization. The
’top-down’ definition is the most commonly used in Europeanization literature. Par-
ticularly in studies, where the focus is on the impact of EU policies on national pol-
icy goals, choices of policy instruments, and policy-specific organizational structures,
this perspective have been used as it has a significant advantage; "’the top’, i.e. the
independent variable, is typically quite clearly identifiable" (Lenschow 2006:58). Nor-
matively, the scope is very wide as focus not necessarily is on implantation of a pre-
scribed EU approach, but rather on national transformation processes in general (Lenschow
2006:58).
When Europeanization is viewed as a round-about or cyclical process it refers to a
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discursive context where domestic actors respond to impulses coming from the EU,
resulting in influence on the domestic policy-making;
"creating a frame of reference to domestic actors who not merely react to European
impulses but anticipate such impulses by either inducing bottom-up processes chang-
ing the European level or by ’using’ or ’endogenising’ Europe in domestic politics inde-
pendent or specific pressures from Brussels" (Lenschow 2006:59).
Because this approach deals with the behavior of national political actors who are
influenced by a point of reference on the EU level, it is compatible with the top-down
approach. In studying Europeanization as a cyclical process, it is particular impor-
tant to keep impulses coming from the EU separate from the domestic (Lenschow
2006:59).
It is clear that Europeanization is a broad concept, which encompasses a number
of different mechanisms that can bring about domestic change - not an explanatory
concept in itself. Either directly or indirectly, the EU provides the impulse for do-
mestic change, which can "flow top-down, horizontally and ’round-about’" Lenschow
2006:59). Our focus and theoretical question is concerned with explaining the (lack
of) change brought about by the EU. We investigate the impact which European inte-
gration has had (and still has) on the domestic polity, policy and politics in Bulgaria.
This means that our approach to Europeanization theory will be a top-down approach
(Bulmer 2008: 48).
3.1.2 The mechanisms of Europeanization
Domestic impact of Europe varies unsystematically across policy sectors and coun-
tries; the same policy might create fundamental reforms in one country, and have no
impact in others. Europeanization is not convergence because there is a difference
between a process and its consequences, but Europeanization can produce conver-
gence or divergence. Policy convergence is more likely than institutional convergence
because EU rules and regulations require convergence in policy outcomes, but they
leave a lot of room for different institutional and administrative arrangements (Börzel
and Risse 2000: 12).
Different mechanisms of Europeanization can be identified in explaining the vary-
ing impact of European integration. Some scientists divide these into three divergent
theoretical concepts: positive integration, negative integration and framing. Other sci-
entists divide them into two groups: horizontal and vertical integration. Vertical in-
tegration is based on adaptational pressure from a hierarchical chain of command
conforming to EU policy, also referred to as positive integration. Horizontal integra-
tion refers to a process with no pressure to conform to specific EU policy models, but
is based on the market, also called negative integration, or triggered by the flow of
ideas and discourses of good policy and best practice.
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Vertical Europeanization and positive integration, is exemplified by areas such as con-
sumer protection, environmental policy, health and safety at work. Here, new regula-
tory policies, designed at EU level, prescribe the adaptation of a model. The prescrip-
tion of an EU model creates adaptational pressure - "they are under pressure to adapt
to Europe" (Radaelli 2003:42). Negative integration takes place when EU strikes down
national barriers to create the European market. This mechanism starts with vertical
prerequisites, but has horizontal consequences. Here, no specific model is prescribed,
instead the role of mutual recognition is emphasized (Radaelli 2003:42). The aim is to
exclude certain options in national policy choices focusing mainly on the abolition of
domestic administrative arrangements, which distort the Common Market (Radaelli
2003:42). This does in many ways characterize the EU pressure on Bulgaria and the
reform of the judiciary. Even though there is a clear demand from the EU that Bul-
garia should reform the judiciary, no clear specific model is prescribed to replace the
existing one.
Horizontal Europeanization is not only based on "hard" instruments, such as direc-
tives, regulations, and decisions of the European Court of Justice, but also on softer
framing mechanisms (Radaelli 2003:43). Some of these framing mechanisms can be
called minimalist directives or non-compulsory regulations, which provide legitimacy
for domestic reformers in need of justifying possible solutions in the national debate
"by ’inseminating’ possible solutions [Eˇ] and by altering expectations about the fu-
ture" (Radaelli 2003:43). They do not create any adaptational pressure but can, never-
theless, be very powerful in triggering learning dynamics or a different political way of
thinking4 (Radaelli 2003:43). Furthermore, framing focuses on the cognitive impact of
European policies on the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors. Europeaniza-
tion by framing domestic beliefs and expectations is a mechanism aimed at prepar-
ing the ground for more demanding policies. By changing domestic beliefs it might
affect strategies and preferences of domestic actors and lead to institutional adapta-
tions (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 258).
3.2 The concepts of misfit and adaptational pressure
A common point in Europeanization top-down research is that there has to be a mis-
fit between national policies and European policies in order for there to be domestic
change. This is often referred to as the goodness of fit hypothesis5. Francesco Duina
was the first to formulate the goodness of fit argument (Mastenbroek and Kaeding
2006:333 and Duina 1997). According to him, the implementation of EU directives,
4 Another soft framing mechanism is the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which provides EU guidelines
and the sharing of best practices, which will then result in convergence towards EU goals. The idea is that instead
of being merely a law-making system the EU is also a platform for policy transfer, which can help the member
states develop their own policies (Radaelli 2003:43-44).
5 The idea behind the hypothesis originates in the work by Adrienne Héritier (Héritier 1995). Héritier argues
that member states seek to influence and shape European policymaking as a mirror of their own policies intending
to make those binding EU legislation. The reason is to minimize adaptation costs and further their own industry’s
chances by creating a level European playing field (Héritier 1995:278). Several researchers have since extended the
notion to the process of EU adaptation (Duina 1997, Knill and Lenschow 1998, Risse 2001, Bulmer and Radaelli
2004, Caporaso 2008).
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and thereby the EU compliance, depend on the fit between the directive and two do-
mestic institutions: "the legal and administrative traditions of a country, and the or-
ganization of interest groups" (Duina 1997:175). If the differences are too many, the
implementation will be poor. On the other hand, if a directive is in line with the insti-
tutional landscape, the implementation will go smooth (Duina 1997: 175). Caporaso
first focuses on the degree of pressure created by Europeanization. He continues "this
pressure is a function of the degree of misfit between "Europe" and the domestic level"
(Caporaso 2008:29). This means that if there is a good fit, the pressure for change at
the domestic level will be small. A greater pressure will result in a more significant re-
sponse or a bigger deviation from the EU norm (Caporaso 2008: 29). Risse, Cowles and
Caporaso argues that in order to produce domestic effects, EU policy must be some-
what difficult to absorb at the domestic level, i.e. moderate goodness of fit (Bulmer
and Radaelli 2004). "If adaptational pressures are very high, European institutions se-
riously challenge the identity, constitutive principles, core structures, and practices of
national institutions" (Risse 2001: 8). A situation where the misfit is to high might cre-
ate a reaction of inertia. Ellen Mastenbroek and Michel Kaeding have studied several
reports where the goodness of fit thesis has been tested and they argue that the key
determinant for domestic change is not misfit but rather domestic mediating factors.
Focus should be directly on the preferences and beliefs of domestic actors instead of
on the status quo (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006:337, 347-348). Despite this, authors
have continued to use the hypothesis and, maintaining misfit as a necessary rather
than as a sufficient condition for change, have broadened the scope and sought to
bring more dynamism into the framework.
Toshkov developes the notion of misfit as a precondition for adaptational pressure.
First, the adaptational pressure is a product of the impulse for change and the power
used to press for the change. It is simply assumed that this pressure remains the same
across countries, across policy sectors, and across time. But variance can come from
several sources. The EU could exercise quite different pressure for change during the
process. As a result, the adaptational pressure is much higher, even though the level
of misfit stays the same, for the simple reason that more attention and resources are
focused to raise the adaptational pressure. Second, radical changes focus more at-
tention and are likely to generate more pressure than minor adaptations. Third, ex-
ogenous impulses for change enter the domestic political system with different prior-
ity ranks, depending how seriously the EU is taken in the domestic context (Toshkov
2005: 5).
The conclusion is that "the variable adaptational pressure must be decoupled from
the variable goodness of fit and the exact relationship between the two should be in-
vestigated" (Toshkov 2005: 6).
We will return to the variable adaptational pressure in section 3.3 on conditionality.
Another specification of the dependent variable ’domestic change’ is necessary. We
should distinguish whether we are talking about misfit studies of transposition, im-
plementation, enforcement, or policy outcomes. When studying legal transposition,
e.g. as long as the transposition concerns formal institutional change, a high policy
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misfit may not generate opposition. At the implementation stages problems may oc-
cur do to a high initial misfit (Toshkov 2005: 6).
3.2.1 Breaking down the misfit
Börzel and Risse identify two types of misfit. The first is policy misfit, which describes
a situation where European rules and regulations clash with domestic policies result-
ing in a compliance problem. National policy goals, regulatory standards, or e.g. an
underlying problem-solving approach may be challenged, and adaptational pressure
to comply is created. Underlying institutions may also be submitted to adaptational
pressure (Börzel and Risse 2000:5). The second is institutional misfit, where Euro-
peanization challenges domestic rules and procedures (Borzel and Risse 2000: 6). In-
stitutional misfit is concerned with the level of change which is needed to adapt to
European measures, exemplified by positive integration, where policies change insti-
tutional structures. Here, the mechanism of Europeanization is institutional compli-
ance, directed at replacing domestic regulatory arrangements (Knill and Lehmkuhl
2002: 258). Toshkov argues that the concept of misfit is ’undertheorized’ and under-
specified, and it is necessary to be clear about which type of misfit we have in mind.
As the concept institution is so broad, using concepts like ’institutional misfit’ or ’pol-
icy misfit’ leaves to much room for ambiguity. A concretization of what we have in
mind when speaking of institutional misfit is needed. Legal misfit concerns the com-
patibility of a new body of codified rules, with the existing domestic legal system. It
deals with formal institutions and is readily measurable. This contrasts with misfit
that focuses on informal institutions, expressed in notions like culture, logic of ap-
propriateness or administrative traditions. Organizational misfit refers to the formal
institutional setup of the judiciary and the inter-institutional relationship e.g. the sep-
aration of powers. The cultural misfit could be anchored in actor centered explanation
of interests and change, or it could be anchored in the notion of logic of appropriate-
ness. The later both referring to specific delimitated clusters, or versions were the
logic penetrates every aspects of the institutions in a policy field or even a country
(Toshkov 2005: 7-10).
The way misfit is operationalized reflects different views about institutions and in-
stitutional change, as the concept can be captured in the language of all three in-
stitutional schools. This doesn’t mean that the misfit hypothesis leads to a meta-
theoretical consensus, but that they all can accommodate the goodness of fit notion.
Speaking only of misfit makes little sense, but the misfit concept in this project will
provide us with two analytical values. First, it will delimit the cases for empirical in-
vestigation. It is not the explanandum, rather it helps us establish the relevant cases
for our research. Second, we regard misfit as being a necessary, but not a sufficient
condition for domestic change. This leads us to two variables; first, it brings us back
to a distinction made earlier between adaptational pressure and misfit. Second, it
leads us to a central point in the Europeanization theory, namely the mediating fac-
tors in the specific country under investigation. Both these variables will be presented
in the next sections.
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3.3 Adaptational pressure - Conditionality
In which ways does the EU exercise its influence on Bulgaria? Europeanization can be
understood as a process in which states adopt EU rules. The rules cover a broad range
of formal and informal issues and structures. Rule adaptation is generally compatible
with both rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalist theory. By
focusing on rule adaptation, we focus on the institutionalization of EU rules, for ex-
ample the transposition of EU law, the restructuring of institutions according to EU
standards and requirements, and the change of domestic practices according to EU
standards.
But under what circumstances is Bulgaria most likely to adopt EU rules, and how do
we distinguish between different forms of adoption? (Schimmelfennig 2005: 7). We
can distinguish between to logics of adaptation, through the logic of consequence and
the logic of appropriateness. Furthermore, these two logics can be driven by external
incentives and social learning, or they can be domestically driven. It might appear
that the former process characterizes all issue areas where the EU exercises adapta-
tion pressure, but conditionality has not been enforced vigorously at all times. Still,
the Bulgarian case has shown a great deal of inertia both from the political as well as
the judiciary system when it comes to reform the judicial sector, therefore our focus is
on the external incentive model and social learning. As for the social learning model,
we will not go deeper into this mechanism in section 3.5 of the theory.
The external incentives model is a rationalist bargaining model, where actors exchange
information threats and promises to their preferences. The EU sets adoption of its
rules as conditions, which Bulgaria has to fulfill in order to receive rewards from the
EU.
Conditionality literature is vast but refers to conditionality as a concept describing
complying with EU pressure in order to be able to achieve membership of the EU
community. The concept has however been stretched due to the ’safeguard clauses’
in the Accession Treaties. After Bulgaria provisionally closed all the acquis chapters,
the accession date of 2007 was confirmed in the Brussels European Council of 16-17
December 2004. But this was not done without introducing the instrument of ’safe-
guard clauses’, which meant that the EU could withhold the benefits of membership
before accession, or in the three years after accession, if certain reforms where lacking
particularly in the policy fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Treaty of the European
Union: Art. 38) and competition were not completed (Trauner 2009: 11). An addi-
tional new instrument was also introduced, namely the post-accession monitoring of
governance standards, which lead the Commission to establish the Cooperation and
Verification Mechanism (Trauner 2009: 17). Both the financial and monitoring condi-
tionality instruments will be presented in the analysis in more detail.
One could view conditionality as a strategy of reinforcement by reward. Under this
strategy, the EU pays the reward if the target government complies with conditions,
and withholds the reward if it fails to comply. The starting point of the bargaining
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process is a domestic status quo, which differs to some extent from an EU rule. This
difference is what we referred to as the goodness of fit or misfit. The status quo is con-
ceived as a domestic equilibrium reflecting the current distribution of preferences and
bargaining power in Bulgaria (Schimmelfennig 2005: 11). EU conditionality upsets
this equilibrium by introducing additional incentives for compliance with EU rules.
But it is important to distinguish analytically between the use of conditionality as a
political strategy, and its causal impacts on domestic policy. Conditionality might not
be effective in some areas, and policy and institutional change might not be causally
related to it. Conditionality is often used rather loosely in accounts of the EU’s in-
fluence on the CEECs, without a clear analytical specification of what it entails and
under what conditions it has an impact. For this purpose Schimmelfennig constructs
hypotheses which explain the dynamics of the external incentives model and may de-
termine the variation in the adaptation.
• A government adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic
adaptation costs;
• The likelihood of rule adoption increases, if rules are set as a condition for re-
wards and the more determinate they are;
• The likelihood of rule adoption increases with the size and speed of rewards;
• The likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional threats
and promises;
• The likelihood of rule adoption decreases with the number of veto players in-
curring net adaptation costs from compliance (Schimmelfennig 2005: 10-17).
What it obvious is that, apart from the level of misfit and the domestic factors
which will be presented in the next section, the EU has an important role in creating
pressure. But more importantly, the way the EU exercises this pressure can have an
impact on the outcomes of the reform of the Bulgarian judicial system. The outcome
or the effects of the pressure are determined by the size of sanctions and rewards, the
speed but very importantly the credibility of EUs will to enact the sanctions and re-
wards in place. Furthermore, the determinacy of the conditions plays an important
role as well.
3.4 Mediating factors
As determined so far, the level of misfits and the EU pressure are not sufficient to
determine the degree and direction of domestic response. For this we need to look
at the domestic mediating factors in Bulgaria. For analytical and presentational pur-
poses, they will be divided into two theoretical groups, namely the rational choice and
sociological institutionalist schools.
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3.4.1 Rational choice institutionalism
The rational choice school characterises humans as acting based upon a calculation of
the costs and benefits attributable to their available options. This is known as the logic
of consequentiality. Humans are completely strategic and only interested in their per-
sonal benefits and preferences. The fact that people work together instead of against
each other is only possible when both sides receive added benefits under such cir-
cumstances. Humans only follow rules when it is rationally calculable as better for
them - that is, where effect of an institution upon overall human behaviour can be
seen as beneficial to the strategic individual (Steinmo 2007:9-10).
Politics is, from a rational choice point of view, "a series of collective action dilemmas"
(Hall and Taylor 2007:176). Results in policy are, generally, not the best for the people,
because every involved actor tries to maximize its own benefit. Only an institutional
agreement can make it possible, to get the best result for the people, if such an in-
stitutional agreement guaranteed similar corresponding actions, i.e. complementary
behaviour, by all involved actors (Hall and Taylor 2007:176). Moreover, the rational
choice school "emphasize[s] the role of strategic interaction in the determination of
political outcomes" (Hall and Taylor 2007:176). Humans act in a strategic way and
this strategic way is influenced by the expectations of the surrounding actors’ action.
Institutions therefore structure how people act and thus structure what actions one
actor can expect from another actor. This can be done in different ways. First, institu-
tions can limit the possibility of choices because of the threat of punishment. Second,
institutions can influence the possibility of a choice by making background informa-
tion about the choice public. In that way, institutions can guide actors to one specific
choice. Institutions are usually created based on a voluntary contract between the im-
portant actors. In the case of another institution being created with nearly the same
structuring effect for the society, the institution that produces the most benefits for
the involved actors will continue to function (Hall and Taylor 2007:176).
As Schmidt writes, the theory of the rational choice school is
"often highly functionalist because it tends to explain the origins of an institution
largely in terms of its effects: highly intentionalist because it assumes that rational ac-
tors not only perceive the effects of the institutions that affect them but can also cre-
ate and control them; and highly voluntarist because they see institutional creation as
a quasi-contractual process rather than affected by asymmetries of power" (Schmidt
2005:5).
Three of the key factors rational choice institutionalists work with when hypothesiz-
ing on domestic change are the existence of multiple veto players, mediating formal
institutions and differential empowerment of actors (Pollack 2007:41). Multiple veto
players describes a situation where power is dispersed across the political system.
This is likely to inhibit or considerably slow down the adaptational process (Radaelli
2003:46). Multiple veto players refers to all the stages in the decision making process
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on which agreement is legally required for a policy change (Haverland 2000:85). Eu-
ropean legislation often includes additional provisions which are there to ensure an
effective implementation and are necessary to make EU directives fit legal situations
in the member states or to produce certain legislative conditions for application. The
provisions, however, often require the involvement and consent of several other insti-
tutional players, all with their own interests (Haverland 2000:85). These veto players
will only accept solutions that are preferable to the status quo (Tsebelis 2002: 285).
An example in the case of Bulgaria is the Constitutional Court that has an important
role in ruling whether amendments to the Constitution decided by the executive are
valid or not (Bozhilova 2007: 292). A supplement to this concept is the scope and type
of leadership (Radaelli 2003:47). The executive leadership can be everything from in-
tegrated to "fragmented, short-lived, and conflict-ridden" (Radaelli 2003:47) and it
can be very important, which ’group’ the leadership falls in to. An integrated leader-
ship has a low number of veto players and policy change may take place regardless
of whether European policy exists. If, on the other hand, the executive leadership is
fragmented, there is likely to be many strong sectoral veto players and an EU-induced
change is unlikely (Radaelli 2003:47). This might prove a case in the political climate
in Bulgaria, which is very uncertain. Since 1990, there have been nine different prime
ministers, only two have sat a full term, and the government is usually a minority
government often relying on a very diverse coalition (Baker and Baumgartl 1998:186,
Andreev 2009: 378).
The second mediating factor central to rationalist domestic change is mediating for-
mal institutions. These institutions can affect the veto players and might alleviate a
situation where the adaptational process has been slowed down or inhibited. Medi-
ating formal institutions describes institutional arrangements which provide actors
with resources to induce structural change. These resources can both be material as
well as ideational. The idea is that smaller actors, e.g. regions, which do not have
the resources (financial, manpower, expertise) to hold a permanent representation in
Brussels, may can seek guidance from public agencies or related complementary in-
stitutions (Börzel and Risse 2003:65).
The factors above focus on mediating institutional factors that facilitate or prohibit
structural change as a response to Europeanization. But institutions also affect actors’
interests and might provide new opportunities for the actors to pursue, and thus pro-
duce, structural change. A third mediating factor is identified, differential empower-
ment of actors, which describes a situation where Europeanization leads to a redistri-
bution of power. This can be seen in many areas such as legislatures, courts, regional
governments, interests groups and companies. The ability for actors to pursue new
opportunities depends on their previous resources given by domestic institutions.
To sum up, the adaptational pressures, and the degree of misfit that stems from Eu-
ropeanization, can be conceptualized as making new opportunities available to some
actors and hindering others (Börzel and Risse 2003: 65). Multiple veto points and fa-
cilitating institutions exert opposite effects on the actors ability to induce structural
change. Both factors are derived from the ’logic of consequentialism’, and have no
effect on the actors’ interests or identities but provide resources to further the actors’
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interests and identities. Differential empowerment of actors determine whether the
new opportunities and hindrances, resulting from Europeanization in case of misfit,
translate into an effectual redistributing of resources among the actors and thereby
domestic changes (Pollack 2007: 41 and Börzel and Risse 2003:65).
3.5 Europeanization as a process of Socialization and
Learning
Sociological institutionalism has a different approach to domestic change and thus
offers a toolkit which we believe can supplement the one given by rational choice in-
stitutionalism.
Where the rational choice school adheres to ’logic of consequentialism’, the sociologi-
cal school follows a ’logic of appropriateness’. The sociological school in contradiction
to the rational choice school understands humans as social creatures. Humans are not
as rational as they are in the rational choice school (Steinmo 2007:10) and even ratio-
nality is "socially constructed" (Schmidt 2005:8). Humans in the sociological school
operate because of their personal habits. In contrast to the rational choice school peo-
ple do not ask themselves about the benefits they will receive when they act, they ask
themselves which action will be correct i.e. appropriate. According to this, people ask
themselves about the norms, which structure their daily life (Steinmo 2007:9-10).
In addition to the differences in how to see human nature, also the function of institu-
tions differs in the rational choice school and the sociological school. Implied in the
question of which action will be correct lies the function of institutions; institutions
provide the norms and values that form the basis of the daily life and also their way of
life. For the sociological school, institutions build the background for how people see
the world and thus institutions are not only rules in which people try to live and to act
(Steinmo 2007:9-10), they are also the means through which people can understand
their world. This is a very important part of the theory of sociological institutional-
ism. The sociological school tries to figure out which concepts of thinking determine
a specific behaviour. These concepts also create the frame for how to understand the
behaviour of an actor. Institutions do not only set the frame for how one should act
- they also determine how a person can imagine reacting in a specific situation, i.e.
"The self-images and identities of social actors are said to be constituted from the in-
stitutional forms, images and signs provided by social life" (Hall and Taylor 2007:179).
Sociological institutionalists understand Europeanization as new rules, norms, prac-
tises, and structures of meaning which are emerging and to which member states are
not only exposed to but also have to implement and incorporate into their own do-
mestic structures and practices (Börzel and Risse 2003:66). The relationship between
institutions and human actors is very narrow. When human beings act in a specific
way, which is defined by the culture in which they live, they re-create with every act
the underlying culture and with the culture also the underlying institutions. In ad-
dition, as a basis for human beings to react and act, interpretation from the outside
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world is necessary. This interpretation is built up on the cognitive schemes, which are
given by institutions, especially culture. As already mentioned, human beings can act
and interpret acts in a rational way, but this rationality is socially created (Hall and
Taylor 2007:179).
There are two main approaches two Europeanization mechanisms in the sociolog-
ical institutionalist school. The first is structuralist and the second agency-centered
(Börzel and Risse 2003: 66). Our focus will be on the agency-centred approach due
to two reasons. First, methodologically it is clearer how to operationalize it which,
as discussed in our methodology chapter, is a criticism of many of the sociological
approaches to Europeanization. Our aim is to meet this criticism by having clear hy-
potheses on when socialization has taken place, and through which mechanisms this
occurs. The second reason for our choice is our pragmatic approach in combining
to the two institutionalisms logics. As discussed in section 2.2.5 we wish be open for
both to be in play at distinct times in the process.
3.5.1 Institutional isomorphism
Institutional isomorphism is the focus of the structuralist explanation of domestic
change and describes "a process of homogenization of organizational structures over
time" (Börzel and Risse 2003:66). The argument is that institutions which have close
contact either through frequent interaction, through exposure to each other, or are
located in a similar environment will grow alike over time. All part of the institution
is influenced including formal organizational structures, principles of resource allo-
cation, practices, meaning structures, and reform patterns (Börzel and Risse 2003:66).
Institutional isomorphism assumes that if the environment of an institution changes,
the actors will attempt to match the institution to the changes in the environment - a
form of structural determinism and not functional. The driving force will be to try to
react to changes in the normative and cognitive environment. Institutional isomor-
phism is most likely to take place in instances where the organizational structures
are clear-cut, stable and formalized (Börzel and Risse 2003:66). There are, however,
weak points in the argument of institutional isomorphism when it comes to explain-
ing variation in adaption to a similar environment. Following, it is not able to account
for the irregular impact of Europe, i.e. Europeanization, given that there are many
cases where there is an absence of structural convergence (Börzel and Risse 2003:66).
3.5.2 Do international institutions have the ability to socialize
agents?
The agency-centred version of sociological institutionalism theorizes differences in
how much domestic norms and institutions change in response to institutional ar-
rangements from the international arena (Börzel and Risse 2003:66). It focuses on a
process of socialization where actors learn to adapt to and internalize new rules and
norms and in return receive ’membership’ of the international society (Mastenbroek
and Kaeding 2006:145, Börzel and Risse 2003:66). One could hypothesize that if status
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quo reflects what the domestic actors find appropriate, then they will have difficulties
in adapting EU policies that goes against the status quo. Mastenbroek and Kaeding
argue that it is not the status quo which is important but rather the belief system un-
derlying the status quo - a belief system which may have changed from the status
quo:
"[...] EU compliance is best seen as a process in which domestic actors are confronted
with EU policies, which may or may not clash with domestically held beliefs" (Masten-
broek and Kaeding 2006:345).
Furthermore, it also plays a part how deeply embedded a domestic belief system is
- if it is not deeply embedded then it is not likely to form an obstacle to adaptation
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006:345).
An important question to ask, is if international institutions have the ability to so-
cialize agents? By agents is meant both individual policymakers and states. Checkel
defines socialization as "a process of inducting actors into norms and rules of a given
community" (Checkel 2007: 5). In order for socialization to have taken place, the
adoption has to be sustained over time independently of structures of material incen-
tives or sanctions. Put in other words, when a shift from a logic of consequentiality to
a logic appropriateness has occurred.
Checkel distinguishes between two forms of appropriateness. The first is role playing
and is referred to as Type 1 socialization or internalization. Here, role playing refers
to when agents act in accordance to expectations, whether they like it or not, it is a
replacement of conscious instrumental calculation with conscious role playing. The
second form of appropriateness describes a situation where agents go beyond role
playing but internalize the norms and values of the community. In this case, agents
adopt interests and even identities of the community thus moving from a conscious
instrumental calculation to a "taken for grandtedness" (Checkel 2007: 6).
Checkel presents three mechanisms: strategic calculation, role playing, and norma-
tive suasion. These suggest three modes of rationality, which may lead to socializa-
tion outcomes; instrumental, bounded, and communicative (Checkel 2007: 6). The
mechanisms should be viewed as hypotheses of recurrent processes linking specified
initial conditions and a specific outcome, in this case international institutions (the
EU) and socializing outcomes in Bulgaria. Socialization is understood either through
the adaption of new roles (Type 1) or changes in values and interests (Type 2) (Checkel
2007: 9). We will not apply the term role playing6 as this is not relevant for the condi-
6The term Role playing is derived from organizational theory. Agents are viewed as bounded rational, and not
able to attend everything simultaneously or to calculate the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action. Or-
ganizations and group environments trigger roles, where individual behavior will involve a degree of automatism.
Role playing involves a shift from a logic of consequentiality to a logic of appropriateness because it involves non
calculative behavioral adaptation. In our terms of socialization outcome, it is Type 1 internalization. This particu-
lar mechanism supports the old neo-functionalist claim that prolonged exposure and communication in European
institutions promote a greater sense of "we-ness" and socialization dynamics. Individuals and states might take
on roles because it is easier socially, as opposed to only and always acting strategically and instrumentally. This is
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tions of this case, which is why we will limit the presentation to strategic calculation
and normative suasion. Two issues should be brought to the reader’s attention when
employing an agency-centred approach in a theory which has a constructivist ontol-
ogy. First, our choice of Socialization theory does not view international institutions
as part of the social environment that structures interaction and identities, but in-
ternational institutions as actors. The former refers to socialization in its "true sense"
and the latter resembles more the exertion of soft power. The two processes presented
as mechanisms of socialization are bargaining, referring to strategic calculation in the
form of conditionality, and arguing, referring to persuasion or normative suasion. If
we see Type 2 internalization as the end point of socialization, then arguing seems to
be the only process that leads directly to it. Strategic calculation is best suited for ex-
plaining Type 1 socialization, and thus comes to a halt before full internalization has
taken place, and can better be understood as taking place at the beginning of a pro-
cess. It may therefore also be necessary to look at secondary links in the causal chain
of mechanisms. We have focused on primary mechanisms only (Zürn and Checkel
2007: 249-250).
Strategic calculation has its roots in rational choice theory. In cases where this mecha-
nism operates alone, there can be no socialization. Put in other words, a switch from a
logic of consequentiality to a logic of appropriateness. However, what starts as strate-
gic behavior may, due to cognitive and institutional effects, result in sustained com-
pliance, which may suggest internalization and preference change. Political condi-
tionality is at the center of this explanation. Conditionality is defined as the use of
material incentives to bring about a desired change in the behavior of at target state,
as introduced in section 3.3. An example of this could be the EU demands of protec-
tion of minority rights as a condition for Bulgaria to become member of the EU.
Under which conditions might incentives and rewards lead to behavioral adaptation?
Checkel puts forward the following conditions for a behavioral adaptation in line with
community norms to occur through strategic calculation:
• The targeted government expects the promises of reward to be greater than the
costs of compliance;
• The targeted social actors expect the costs of putting pressure on their govern-
ment to be lower than the benefits of conditional external awards, and these
actors are strong enough to force the government to comply with the interna-
tional norms.
These propositions encapsulate an important part of an international institutions
domestic impact, but the ontology is individualistic and the core perceptions of actors
are taken as given, therefore making it ill equiped to explain changes in which basic
properties of agents are changing (Checkel 2007: 10).
an understudied dynamic and different from the instrumental or normative ones (Checkel 2007: 11-12).
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The second mechanism, normative suasion, is derived from the constructivist camp
in international relations theory drawing on Habermasian theory. According to Jür-
gen Habermas, actors are able to challenge the validity of all parts of a normative
statement - "an agency-centered mode of interaction that enables actors to challenge
the validity claims inherent in any normative statement by persuasion [...] [t]he aim
here is a reasoned consensus" (Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006:345). Here rational
social agents are not understood as calculating costs and benefits, or seeking cues
from the environment. Instead, through communication, they seek to present argu-
ments to convince each other, and their preferences and interests are open for redef-
inition. This is a process, where agents internalize new understandings of appropri-
ateness, actively and reflectively. International institutions and organizations are in
this view seen as ’talk shops’, where arguments and persuasion may change the most
basic properties of agents. Put in other words, strategic calculation mechanism views
language as a tool for self interested actors, whereas the normative suasion mecha-
nism incorporates it as constitutive of agents and their interests. Several conditions
should hold for a change to occur in the interests of social agents:
• The target of socialization attempt is in a novel and uncertain environment and
thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information;
• The target has few prior ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the social-
izing agency’s message;
• The socializing agency/individual is an authoritative member of the ingroup to
which the target belongs or wants to belong;
• The socializing agency/individual does not lecture or demand but, instead, acts
out principles of serious deliberative argument;
• The agency/target interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, set-
tings (Checkel 2007: 13-14).
• A government adopts EU rules if it is persuaded of the appropriateness of EU
rules;
• The likelihood of rule adaption increases as the legitimacy of the rules increases;
• The likelihood of rule adoption increases with the identification of the target
government and society with the community that has established the rules (Schim-
melfennig 2005: 18-20).
Mastenbroek and Kaeding point out two facilitating factors for normative suasion
to take place Norm Entrepreneurs and Political and Organizational Cultures (Maas-
tenbroek and Kaeding 2006:345). Norm entrepreneurs describes a situation where
individuals and group who do not like the existing political rules and norms group
together in order to try to change these Mastenbroek and Kaeding 2006: 345-346).
Norm entrepreneurs’ work is characterized by using moral arguments and strategic
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constructions as way of persuading actors to redefine their interests and identities,
engaging them in processes of social learning. "Persuasion and arguing are the mech-
anisms by which these norm entrepreneurs try to induce change" (Börzel and Risse
2003:67). Political and Organizational Cultures describes under which understand-
ings it is legitimate to pursue certain behavior. This "informal" institutional mecha-
nism could overcome a factor such as veto points, if there is a political culture of con-
sensus, cooperation, and cost sharing in decision making process (Börzel and Risse
2003:68).
Summing up, the sociological logic of domestic change focuses on arguing, learning
and strategic calculation as the mechanisms by which new norms and identities stem-
ming from Europeanization processes are adopted by domestic actors and can lead to
a change in the definition of preferences and of collective identities (Börzel and Risse
2003:68).
3.5.3 Direction and scope of Europeanization
How do we make the concept of Europeanization useful for an empirical analysis,
and organize the research? One approach is to ask two questions: "What is Euro-
peanized?" and "to what extent?" The first question refers to the domains of Euro-
peanization. This can be divided in three groups to make a distinction between macro-
domestic structures, public policy, and cognitive-normative structures. Domestic struc-
tures includes; political structure (cabinet-assembly relations), public administration,
intergovernmental relations, legal structures, political parties, pressure groups, and
societal cleavage structures. Public policy is the outcome of the domestic structures
but it may also have effects on it. For analytical reasons, however, the distinction is
made between the two. Public policy covers all elements, such as actors, the style
of policy making, resources, and policy instruments. The last dimension is cognitive
and normative dimensions of Europeanization which includes discourse, political le-
gitimacy, identities, state traditions, and policy paradigms.
The second question refers to the directions and the extent of change. Four possible
outcomes are identified; Retrenchment, Inertia, Absorption, and Transformation.
Inertia refers to a situation where no change occurs. This can be due to the policy
model being to dissimilar to domestic models. Inertia may be expressed as lags and
delays in the implementation of directives, or resistance to EU induced change. In
the long run, inertia can become economically and politically impossible. Absorp-
tion stands for change as adaptation. Domestic structures and policies absorb non-
fundamental change and maintain their core and logic of political behavior. Transfor-
mation refers to a paradigmatic change, where the fundamental logic changes. The
last is retrenchment, which describes a situation where domestic policy becomes less
European than before. Sometimes, European pressure may trigger a counter reaction
(Radaelli 2003: 37).
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3.6 Historical institutionalism
Europeanization gives us many tools, through rational choice institutionalism and so-
ciological institutionalism for our analysis of the Bulgarian judicial system and the
transition problems it is facing. We, however, believe that a central point is under-
emphasized - history. Bulgaria is an old nation with a turbulent history and one must
not forget that just two decades ago, Bulgaria was part of the Soviet Union and the
world in which the country operated looked much different than today. To underes-
timate the importance of legacy would be a mistake and we have therefore chosen to
bring in the historical element by including the third school of new institutionalism;
historical institutionalism. This section will contain an overview of the basic elements
of historical institutionalism. We will introduce the concept of path dependency to
help us understand why things seem to be moving so slow in Bulgaria. On the other
hand, we also wish to gain tools which may help us to understand smaller and less
obvious change, which is why a section of endogenous change has been included.
3.6.1 The relationship between institutions and human actions
Humans in historical institutionalism are neither totally rational nor social - they fol-
low norms, values and own interests (Steinmo 2007:10). The historical institutionalists
use both ideas (the one from the rational choice school and the one from the socio-
logical school) about human beings and their behaviour (Hall and Taylor 2007:182).
Hall and Taylor propose to differ between two kinds of explanations, also in the school
of historical institutionalism. Hall and Taylor connect their differentiation to the dif-
ference between the sociological school and the rational choice school. If human be-
ings are seen as rational, Hall and Taylor speak of it as a ’calculus approach’. If human
beings are not only rational but instead also embossed from a personal and individual
worldview, Hall and Taylor speak of a ’cultural approach’. Depending on the approach,
there are totally different answers to the question of how institutions influence hu-
man behaviour, how actors act, and what institutions do (Hall and Taylor 2007:171).
Instead of employing the terms calculus approach and cultural approach we will use
the division employed in the previous sections - the logic of consequentiality and the
logic of appropriateness. It is difficult to bring both these ideas together and therefore
Hall and Taylor criticise the historical institutionalism of not having found an answer
to the question of how institutions precisely influence human beings behaviour (Hall
and Taylor 2007:181). Vivien Schmidt also writes that the historical institutionalists
are not able to explain why persons act in the way they do (Schmidt 2005:7). In gen-
eral, one can say that for the historical institutionalists it depends on the situation,
on the predominant rules and the individual, how human beings act. Therefore, a
specific political result can be a product of all several conditions. Historical institu-
tionalists want to figure out which circumstances end up in a specific political action.
Accordingly, why a specific choice was made and what results were caused by this
choice. To answer these questions we have to look for the specific historical back-
ground (Steinmo 2007:10-13).
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3.6.2 History and path dependency
History is an important part of the historical institutionalism. Therefore, historical
institutionalists are interested in the specific history and how the different histori-
cal variables relate to each other and react interdependently. Historical institutional-
ists are thus paying attention to specific cases. It is for example not their purpose to
explain changing institutions in general. It is enough for them to explain a specific
change. But therefore they need to know the specific historical background, because
they believe that the case is caused by the variables which can only be found in the
unique history. Without knowing them they are not able to explain the case (Steinmo
2007:12-13). Three reasons why history is as important as it is can be summed up; first
of all, one can say that when an event takes place, the historical context has an influ-
ence on the event. Secondly, actors can learn from history and experiences. The third
reason is that one event has an effect on another. All the different variables, choices
and events influence each other (Steinmo 2007:11-12).
To examine historical developments historical institutionalists have created a con-
cept, called path dependency (Hall and Taylor 2007:173). Path dependency means:
"[T]hat when a government programme or organization embarks upon a path there
is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. That path may be al-
tered, but it requires a good deal of political pressure to produce that change" (Peters
2005:71).
In other words, when an institution is created, policy choices are made. These policy
choices will have a great influence on the policy in the future; much effort is needed
to change it. Because of it, "historical institutionalism can appear historically deter-
ministic or even mechanistic where it focuses exclusively on continuities and path-
dependency" (Schmidt 2005:7). This problem is also mentioned by Peters et al. who
remark that path dependency can create an analyses failure from historical institu-
tionalists, because the risk exists that the analyser only points out the choices that
are made and forgets the choices that could have been made as well. The risk is to
forget to show how complicated it is to make decisions, how many different possi-
bilities exist and how uncertain the whole process of decision making is (Peters et al.
2005:1277). In this case we can speak of ’historically determinism’.
In tackling some of the simplicity and ’holes’ in path dependency theory, Paul Pier-
son has elaborated on the theory, making it more complete and concrete than what
is typically found. He argues that a path dependent historical process is character-
ized by a series of events which are self reinforcing. First of all, it is essential when
an event happens in the process because early events can have significant influence
on events later on. The second characteristic is that in the beginning of a path - the
critical juncture - things are relatively open and more things are permitted than later
on in then process, where things are more restrictive. The third feature is that even
though institutions are not completely ’frozen’ they are very difficult to change - the
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longer an institution exists and the more ’positive feedback’ it receives, the harder it
is to change the path (Pierson 2000:75-76).
3.6.3 Increasing returns
Pierson borrows from economic theory when explaining the characteristics of the self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes, naming those increasing returns. Increas-
ing returns pinpoint the costs and benefits over time of switching from one alternative
to another and they focus on issues of timing and sequence "distinguishing formative
moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths" (Pierson
2000b:251). In a process of increasing returns, a path becomes more likely the more
steps are taken along the path. This is because the costs of changing paths - the cost
of exit - increase over time. Put in a different way, the benefits of staying on the same
path rise and are therefore self-reinforcing (Pierson 2000b:252).
There are four features of institutions or their social contexts which generate increas-
ing returns.
1. Set-up costs: creating a new institution often involves high start-up costs and
entails a high degree of learning, coordination and adaptation. Established in-
stitutions, on the other hand, already has this and thus generate powerful in-
centives which reinforce their own stability and further development (Pierson
2000b: 255).
2. Learning effects: individuals and organizations learn by going - previously gained
knowledge will lead to higher returns from continued use. Furthermore, when
individuals get used to an institution and learn how to operate with and within
a certain logic, they are likely to continue on the path Pierson 2000b:254).
3. Coordination effects: if the activities of individuals and organization are ’matched’
with those of other individuals or organizations, the benefits are often enhanced
(Pierson 200b:254).
4. Adaptive expectations: Fearing that ’wrong’ choices may have negative effect
later on, it is important for individuals and organizations to chose the ’right
team’ from the beginning. Expectations about the actions of others hence be-
come important (Pierson 200b:254).
The arguments are not only true for single institutions but also groups of institu-
tions: "Institutional arrangements induce complementary organizational forms, which
in turn may generate new complementary institutions" (Pierson 2000b:255); a ma-
trix of interdependent institutions. Furthermore, the path dependency is strongest
at the macro level involving "complementary configurations of organizations and in-
stitutions" (Pierson 2000b:255). This could explain why Bulgaria has not adopted the
practices of the ’high performing’ EU member states in order to quickly induce con-
vergence. The institutions already in place are very hard to change and individu-
als and organizations have adapted to them - if the institutions create incentives for
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nepotism and corruption, actors will invest in becoming good at this and thus con-
tinuing the path. Factors, as the high independence of the judiciary in Bulgaria and
the amount of immunity that magistrates pose, may have contributed to increasing
returns (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 129). Furthermore when dealing with political
institutions there are many aspects, which determine how prone to path dependency
an area is. Overall, Pierson lists four features, which make politics in general favorable
to increasing returns processes: the importance of collective action, the high density
of institutions, the connection between having political authority and being able to
enhance asymmetries of power, and the complex and opaque nature of politics (Pier-
son 2000b:257). Precisely the analysis of power in and around institutions is decisive,
because institutions give some groups more power than other groups. This means
that there are some groups which have more influence and are more involved in mak-
ing decisions than other groups. One can guess that a group with great influence on
the decision-making process wins more often than a group without such an influence
(Hall and Taylor 2007:173). Accordingly the world in which a new institution is cre-
ated is already filled up with different power relations between different institutions,
actors or interests. That means there are already groups with more power than other
groups and they can use this power to create institutions, which are more beneficial
to them than they are to the groups with less power (Hall and Taylor 2007:183).
However, the central problem with path dependency still stands - the question of in-
stitutional change. At what point is a change from an institution strong enough that
from that point on one cannot any longer speak of one path. Or the question refor-
mulated: At what point does a path end? How can one be sure that the path ends?
From what point onward do we speak about an institutional change? (Peters et al.
2005:1287).
This project does not deal with identifying a certain path or investigating whether
there has been a change from one path to another. Rather, we want to explore and
understand the effects the already existing institutions have on the development of
new institutions - i.e. hindering the efficient reform process in Bulgaria. Path depen-
dency can aid us in this because it tells us that already existing institutions do matter,
they do shape the choices being made today and they do affect the future.
3.6.4 Institutional change
Humans are used to the existing rules and do not want to invest costs in order to learn
the new rules. Because of these arguments many institutionalists come to the con-
clusion, that institutions are usually constant and only an external shock can cause a
change of institutions (Steinmo 2007:14). The concept of external shock, however, has
been a controversial issue among historical institutionalists. Some argue that there is
no space for human action in that theory and maintain that one should be careful not
to fail to notice or even exclude the possibility that human actors can change the ex-
isting rules and institutions. As a result, the historical institutionalists say that institu-
tional change can also take place due to events among the institutions - institutional
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change can therefore be produced by external and internal reasons (Steinmo 2007:13-
14). Nonetheless, often only an external shock is mentioned in historical institution-
alists’ analysis. Such an external shock can for example be a war or an economic crisis
(Hall and Taylor 2007:174). As we have mentioned earlier, Bulgaria has had a turbu-
lent history characterized by foreign rule or influence. The fall of the Soviet regime
has undoubtedly had a great impact on Bulgaria and the rest of the region - an im-
pact that changed the whole society and that we believe can be called an external
shock (Grabbe 2004: 99). Guy Peters also comes to the conclusion that the historical
institutionalism is not very exact in formulating how institutional change happens.
For him institutional change is not a main part of the historical institutionalism and
although it is not totally contradicted to the historical institutionalism, institutional
change does not fit well in the theory of institutionalism (Peters 2005:79). Despite of
this, in his article about the politics of path dependency, Guy Peters formulates three
interesting hypotheses about institutional change. First, he mentions that in general
the difference between predominant values and norms and the realised action can
cause institutional changes. The second hypothesis says that an institutional change
is only possible when there is an alternative, which can be used as a substitute. Third,
when an institutional change is made, it can take a longer time until a substitute has
replaced the old one and can survive. Often, a lot of changes follow each other "until
there is some agreement on the validity of the new paradigm" (Peters et al. 2005:1293).
It is clear by the possibilities and hypotheses that change is not merely to be under-
stood as induced by external shocks but can be happen endogenously.
3.6.5 Change from within
Streeck and Thelen suggests that historical institutionalists have a tendency to over-
look smaller changes and write these off as merely adaptive adjustments, taking place
merely as a reaction to altered circumstances and are happening to secure a repro-
duction of existing systems (Streeck and Thelen 2005:1). If we view institutions not
only as a formal structure but as a structure where the central part is the content then
institutional change may not be as rare; "[i]nstitutional structures [...] may be stick-
ier than what they do and what is done through them" (Streeck and Thelen 2005:18).
It is suggested that focus should not only be on the formal structure but equally on
the ’practical enactment’ and that fundamental institutional change - a change of the
path - happens when "a multitude of actors switch from one logic of action to another"
Streeck and Thelen 2005:18). There are several ways which this can happen and it can
happen both gradually and continuously, not only as a ’shock’ or historic ruptures or
openings. Change can take place endogenously and can be generated by the institu-
tion’s own behaviour. The idea is that inbuilt ambiguities and gaps, already existing
in an institution or developed over time between formal institutions and their actual
implementation or enforcement, can create significant institutional change. The ’bat-
tle’ between agency and structure creates an ever evolving environment and political
institutions are subject to an ongoing struggle as actors try to challenge or circumvent
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rules which clash with their own interests in pursuit of their goals. In this way it is not
possible to separate institutional development into periods where either agency or
structure has the upper hand. Instead, the aim should be to understand how change
stems from the actors who are trying to cultivate change from the inside, working
around and utilizing elements of existing opportunities and constraints (Streeck and
Thelen 2005:18-19, Deeg 2005:170-174). Overall, we will present three broad modes of
transformative change - displacement, layering, and conversion.
Displacement describes a society with shifting balances of power and the emergence
and diffusing of new models, which questions the previous organizational forms and
practices. But most of all, it describes the ’struggle’ between incoherent institutional
frameworks existing in all societies. Institutional arrangements coexist with others
with the same logic of action but they also coexist with arrangements, created at a
different time in a different historical setting, which may represent conflicting and
opposing logics. The cultivation, rediscovery or activation of alternative institutional
forms;
"institutional configurations are vulnerable to change through displacement as tra-
ditional arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side in favour of new institutions
and associated behavioural logics" (Streeck and Thelen 2005:20).
The more actors who ’swap’ to a new system, the more accepted it becomes at the
expense of previous traditional institutional forms and behaviours. It is important to
remember that this process does not happen overnight. Opposing logics can coex-
ist and human actors can act simultaneously - and even juggle - in different institu-
tional contexts ruled by contradicting logics. Furthermore, human societies are capa-
ble of encompassing considerable friction between institutions which are differently
constructed - all societies thereby become in some way hybrids (Streeck and Thelen
2005:21).
The way in which change through displacement occurs can be endogenously through
discovery of possibilities, which were previously suppressed or suspended. But change
can also come about through either literally or metaphorical ’invasion’. Literally, in-
vasion refers to instances where foreign institutions have replaced indigenous ones,
often in the case of war. History, however, shows that the result usually becomes a
hybrid instead of the occupying power’s institutions (Streeck and Thelen 2005:21). In
the case of EU influence on the Bulgarian judicial system, the more relevant version
is the metaphorical one which deals with local actors importing and then cultivat-
ing ’foreign’ institutions and practices. Actors may view their interests to be at odds
with the existing institutions and practices or they may wish to ’test’ new ways of be-
haviour inside the old institutions. Such testing may come at a price but if the actors
are willing to be innovative they may be able to get the rule makers to change the in-
stitution or create pressure for change from below. It follows, innovative and deviant
behaviour will in this way become the norm and the traditional behaviour will then
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become the exception (Streeck and Thelen 2005:21-22). In addition, endogenous dis-
placement and displacement by invasion can also work together - "exogenous change
is often advanced by endogenous forces pushing in the same direction but needing to
be activated by outside support" (Streeck and Thelen 2005:22). In the sphere of this
project, this can for example mean that new ideas or old ones lying dormant in the
Bulgarian institutions may be activated by ideas and pressures coming from the EU
resulting in significant institutional change. Displacement does not lead to change
through explicit revision or amendment of existing arrangements. Rather, the change
takes place through small shifts within the existing system. External shocks can play
a role but the change is more likely to happen if the shock is helped by endogenous
change. Likewise, endogenous evolution benefits largely from changing external con-
ditions (Streeck and Thelen 2005:22).
Layering describes another way in which change may occur. The older a system be-
comes, the harder it becomes to change since many actors will have had time to get
invested in the system. This does, however, not mean that change is impossible if re-
formers can find a way to work around the ’stickier’ elements of an institution (Streeck
and Thelen 2005:22-23). A classic example can be found in the welfare system where
old public welfare system can be virtually unchangeable. Instead, reformers estab-
lish new private pension systems layered on top of the old system which can result
in an ’out phasing’ of the public system and a following drain of political support.
Defenders of the status quo may not react as hard as the new layers do not directly
undermine existing institutions. If the new layers operate on a different logic and
grow faster than the old system, the change happens slowly but can nonetheless fun-
damentally change the overall trajectory. Layering is a method by which actors can
induce fundamental change under cover of fixing or complementing old systems and
avoid generating major resistance (Streeck and Thelen 2005:23-24). An example of
this in Bulgaria could be the creation of a new ministry of public administration in or-
der to try and de-politicize the Bulgarian bureaucracy (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008:
131-132).
Conversion is the third mode of change, which we have chosen to include. Here, in-
stitutions are redirected to new goals, functions, or purposes and it can come about
if there is a change in the environment which is responded to by the policymakers by
redirecting existing institutional resources to new ends. Changes in power relations
can also trigger conversion as new actors may choose to take over the institution and
change its use and purpose. Political contestation is central to the redirection of insti-
tutions as it drives the change and it is possible because of gaps between institutional-
ized rules and how they enacted locally - gaps which exist by design or have emerged
over time (Streeck and Thelen 2005:26). Unintended consequences describes one of
these gaps. The designers of institutions are not able to foresee everything, they can
make mistakes and the design of an institution may allow for a redirection of the in-
stitution. Another gap involves the political negotiation often involved in building
an institution, which leads to compromise. This can also lead to different opinions
as to the purpose of the institution, resulting in inbuilt ambiguities and allow space
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for political contestation over the interpretation and application of rules. In this way,
institutions can retain formal continuity but still change widely (Streeck and Thelen
2005:26-27). Gaps in the institutional design can also come about simply because of
time. Many old institutions have outlived their designers and the conditions on which
they were founded. This allow for new uses that may even be completely opposite
to the original idea - "[t]ime, in other words, and the changes it brings in actors and
problems, opens gaps that entail possibilities for institutional conversion" (Streeck and
Thelen 2005:28).
4Research Strategy
After presenting and identifying the relevant theoretical concepts in the former chapter, we will
proceed to clarify the application of the analytical concepts from the theory to our empirical
findings. The aim is to construct a research strategy, which will guide our analysis and aid us
in answering our research question.
Through a thorough review of the scientific research in the field, we will establish the problems
and shortcomings of the Bulgarian judicial system in relation to the accession criteria. How-
ever, our main object of the project is not to show the inadequacy of the Bulgarian system, but
to understand and explain why the reform process is lacking so far behind EU community ex-
pectations.
As presented in our methodology, we have chosen a top down approach keeping the process
of European integration as the independent variable, and the Bulgarian judiciary as the depen-
dent. Our analysis will consist of three parts, the first and the third part are dynamic and the
second is static of nature. First the Europeanization process will be identified. Then the mis-
fit between EU requirements and the domestic level resulting in adaptational pressure will be
determined. Finally, the domestic level and its effects are analyzed in order to understand the
change or lack of change observed.
4.1 Europeanization processes
The first part of the analysis has to do with the pressure the EU is applying on Bul-
garia in order to push the country to reform. The idea behind EU pressure is to shift
the status quo of the domestic policy to one which favors and produces EU minded
reform. Various political instruments are used by the EU for this purpose, these in-
clude; financial aid, safeguard clauses, benchmarks and twinning.
In order for us to understand the mechanisms behind these processes, we draw on
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the concept of conditionality. This concept is derived from the logic of consequential-
ity and focuses Europeanization through incentives, and the conditions under which
sanctions and rewards may have an effect on domestic policy. The reason for doing
this is twofold; first, we wish to identify the pressure created by EU’s instruments. Sec-
ond, we want to determine the impact and effectiveness of these instruments. To sup-
plement the mechanism of conditionality we will draw on three concepts; credibility,
size, and determinacy. These will help us to indentify the strengths and limitations of
EU pressure. We will apply empirical data presenting the various instruments applied
by the EU. Furthermore, the instrument of twinning will be presented and examined
as this is one of the EUs most used instruments to enable reforms in Bulgaria.
4.2 Establishing the misfit
The second step of our analyses entails establishing the misfits. This is in short a de-
scription of the Bulgarian status quo compared to the one favored by EU. The analysis
is static by nature and as written in our theoretical chapter, is a prerequisite for there
to be any adaptational pressure, hence development in Bulgaria. Second, as Toshkov
showed us it is important to separate different types of misfit in order to create pre-
cision in establishing the relevant research area. We have thus chosen to divide the
misfit into three different kinds. First, the legal misfit will be established by analyz-
ing the legal provisions, the drawing up of new legislation, and the transposition of
EU legislation to national Bulgarian law. A large part of the data will be statistics on
infringement and transposition because it is best suited for measuring the amount of
the acquis that has been transposed - it is the formal ’fit’, which is interesting. The sec-
ond part will be an analysis of the organizational misfit, which involves a description
of the formal institutional set-up and the inter-institutional relationship between the
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary discussed against a the normative idea of
the rule of law lying behind the EU requirements. This will be centered around three
concepts; independence accountability and transparency. Finally, the analysis of the
cultural misfit will focus on informal institutions like norms and habits, which deter-
mine the actors’ behavior in the trias politica. This analysis will be centered around
the level of corruption in Bulgaria based on Transparency International, Commission
reports and news articles. These will be discussed against some of the EUs bench-
marks on what Bulgaria should strive to reach in order to fulfill EU demands. We will
also pay attention to the Bulgarian public perception of EU, the judiciary, and public
institutions in general in order to consolidate our findings on the level of corruption.
Through these three analyses we will be able to establish whether there is a misfit
and thus any pressure for change. Furthermore, it will help us establish which misfits
are protruding and relevant for leading the further empirical investigation.
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4.3 Mediating factors and institutional legacies
The third and vital part of our analysis has the object of singling out and analyzing
the mediating factors and institutional legacies. Using theoretical concepts from the
three institutional approaches, we will study what is hindering or facilitating the effect
of the Europeanization process.
4.3.1 Institutional legacies and democratization through
conditionality
The first section of the analysis brings in a historical institutionalist angle on change
and stability. We will draw mainly on two concepts, increasing returns and asymmet-
ric power relations. The aim is to establish whether the former choices of institutional
arrangements have reproductive elements and thus resists itself more to change and
reform. This is done by centering on the choices made in the democratization pro-
cess in the beginning of transition, with special attention on the independence of the
judiciary and the reinstatement of communist magistrates in the new judiciary insti-
tutions.
Furthermore, we will draw attention to smaller endogenous changes. With the help of
the analytical tools; displacement, layering and conversion we will investigate whether
reforms have occurred inside the trias politica which may lay the ground for more fun-
damental change in the long run.
To supplement this analysis we will draw in socialization theory as this is a process
understood over time thus overlapping the historical approach to the empirics. The
strategic calculation mechanism will be applied in order to investigate whether there
is an ongoing process that has led or might be leading to socialization of EU norms.
This is done by examining, if the Bulgarian attitude towards EU norms is sustained
regardless of continued rewards from the EU. If this is the case a socialization and in-
ternalization of EU norms and values is taking place and this entails that Europeaniza-
tion has occurred, and compliance with EU norms will follow. We will draw on empir-
ics focusing on the development of minority rights and democratic norms in general
in order to assess whether there is sustained compliance.
4.3.2 Mediating factors
This section will locate the relevant veto points, supporting formal institutions and
differential empowerment of actors in the trias politica as well as in the judiciary it-
self. The empirical basis for this analysis will draw partly on the knowledge derived
from the organizational misfit analysis, as this concept overlaps with the former con-
cepts in its focus on formal institutions, as well as research articles investigating these
dynamics.
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The analysis will start by uncovering the political culture and the nature of party con-
stellation in Bulgaria in order to assess the potential of judicial reform driven by the
executive and legislative branches of government. We will do this by examining whether
it is short term or long term interests, which is dominating politics in the legislative
and whether there is culture of consensus or conflict. Second, we look closer at the
structure of the institutional setup between the legislative and the judiciary. This is
done to establish whether the given structure empowers certain actors and whether
these act as veto players hindering the reform process. This analysis will mainly cen-
ter on the high independence of the judiciary and the role of the Constitutional Court
and the SJC.
Third, we examine the judiciary itself in order to establish if certain veto players or
institutional structures inside the judiciary are hindering and opposing reform, or
whether the judiciary has the potential to drive the reform process itself. This part
will be centered on the immunity of magistrates, and the particular structure and role
of prosecutors in the Bulgarian judiciary.
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Table 1: Overview of the research strategy
Theoretical Mechanisms Indicators Data
Europeanization Conditionality Size of resources -Twinning Reports
processes Credibility -Commission Reports
Determinacy on progress in Bulgaria
from the period 2005-2010
-Research articles based on
twinning cases, and EU
initiatives through the
PHARE and SAPARD
program
-EU homepages
-Secondary literature
Establishing Legal Misfit Transposition of law -The Commissions
the misfit transposition and
infringement reports
-Commission monitoring
reports
-Secondary literature
Organizational Misfit Institutional structure of -the Bulgarian constitution
the trias politica -research articles on the
-independence Bulgarian trias politica
-accountability -Commission monitoring
-transparency reports on Bulgarian
requirements
-normative theory on the
separation of powers and
checks and balances
Cultural Misfit Corruption Euro barometer
Transparency International
Commission Reports
UN Report
Sophia News Agency
Research article on
Survey of the Bulgarian
people
Institutional Path dependence - Reinstatement of Secondary Literature
legacies and -increasing returns communist magistrates Eurobarometer
democratization Socialization - Independence of the World Bank Report
through -strategic calculation judiciary The Bulgarian Constitution
conditionality Endogenous change -democratization
-displacement -minority rights
-layering -reforms of the judiciary
-conversion
Mediating -Supporting formal -independence of the Secondary Literature
factors institutions judiciary based partly on statistical
-Veto players -immunity of magistrates data from the Bulgarian
-Differential -role of the prosecutors Ministry of Justice, and
empowerment of actors - short term political statistical data from the
Political Culture interests EU.
-Consensus - fragmented and unstable The Bulgarian Constitution
-Conflict political environment
5Analysis
This chapter contains our three-part analysis. We will begin by identifying the Europeanization
process and the conditionality tools, which the EU is applying in pushing for reform in Bulgaria.
Second, we proceed to determine which types of misfit exist between EU requirements and the
domestic level. The last part of the analysis will focus on the domestic level, investigating the
institutional legacies and mediating factors, which are assisting or obstructing change.
5.1 Europeanization processes and post-conditionality
When analyzing the reform process in Bulgaria it is not only enough to establish a
misfit and investigating domestic factors inhibiting or facilitating reform. One also
needs to look at the role of the independent variable, namely the EU and the instru-
ments it utilizes in order to foster reform in Bulgaria. These instruments are politi-
cal and should not be misinterpreted as theoretical mechanisms of Europeanization.
The instruments of Europeanization can have different aims; either through creating
incentives for reform or to socialize actors into new ways of thinking, and it is there-
fore not sufficient to establish the political instruments in use, but also how they are
used. In order to do this, we apply the mechanism of conditionality, and we draw
on three theoretical variables; credibility, determinacy and the size of resources, to
analyze problems related to the effect of the political instruments. We find that this
might uncover part of the reasons behind the Bulgarian reform or lack of it, together
with the domestic explanatory variables, which we will discuss in the later parts of the
analysis.
5.1.1 How does the EU pressure Bulgaria - Identification of the
Europeanization process?
The desire of Bulgaria to join the EU, combined with the high volume of intrusive-
ness of the rules attached to membership, allow the EU an unprecedented influence
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in restructuring domestic institutions. The EU sets over 80 percent of economic reg-
ulations and membership requires proof of the ability to implement the acquis com-
munitaire, which includes over 80,000 pages of legislation. Furthermore, the EU is-
sues detailed and binding statements as well as actively monitoring the progress in
Bulgaria and providing technical expertise (Schimmelfennig 2005: 1-2). But to what
extent and in which ways does the EU exercise its influence on Bulgaria?
Bulgaria has received an important amount of pre-accession funds during the pre-
accession period this has been given together with technical support mostly through
twinning projects. The pre-accession funds have been given under the PHARE, the
SAPARD7 and the ISPA8 program. Furthermore, Bulgaria has continued to be eligi-
ble for support under the 2007 to 2013 financial perspective, this includes structural
funds, cohesion funds, funds from the Cash Flow and Schengen Facility9 and funds
under the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows Program10 (Commission
2008).
The PHARE program has been the main source for the European Community’s finan-
cial and technical support, and has two main priorities. Its aim is to help the Bulgarian
administration to acquire the capacity to implement the Community acquis, and to
the country bring its industry and basic infrastructure up to Community Standards.
The method is to decentralize the management of the assistance as much as possi-
ble to the recipient countries11. Technical support is mostly done through twinning
programs. Twinning is a mechanism where officials from EU member states are sec-
onded to the Bulgarian ministries and other parts of the country’s public administra-
tion. The idea is that an official from a certain institution can assist an official in the
corresponding institution in the other country. The purpose is to help Bulgaria adapt
its administrative and democratic institutions in order to comply with membership
requirements, by learning from other member states experiences.
The credibility of the EUs response to the insufficiency of Bulgarian reforms and the
country’s continuous corruption has and will set the pace for the level of EU impact by
7The SAPARD (Special accession program for agriculture and rural development) program has offered sub-
stantial allocations for rural development policies. The condition for these allocations is that Bulgaria has set up
the required institutions to manage the program according to EU standards (ESI - European Stability Initiative:
http://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=enid=285 (last accessed 09.04.10)).
8The ISPA (Instrument for structural Policies for Pre-accession) has the same general
aim of the PHARE program, of economic and social cohesion, but the ISPA focuses ex-
clusively on environmental and transport infrastructure measures (European Commission 1:
http://ec.europa.eu/regionalp ol i c y/ f und s/i spa/i spae n.htm(l ast accessed09.04.10))
9As part of the Schengen Facility Bulgaria is a beneficiary of the cash flow, to support the country in financ-
ing actions at the new border of the EU in order to implement the Schengen acquis (European Commission
2: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eu10_bulga-
ria_romania/chapters/chap31e n.htm(l ast accessed09.04.10))
10Furthermore, Bulgaria receives funds under the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows estab-
lished as of January 2007 in order to support the member states bearing the burden of implementing the
common standards and control and surveillance of external borders and visa policy (European Commission 3:
http://ec.europa.eu/justiceh ome/ f undi ng /bor der s/ f undi ngb or der se n.htm(l ast accessed09.04.10)).
11EUROPA, Gateway to the European Union 1: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004-
_and_2007_enlargement/e50004_en.htm (last accessed 09.04.10)
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threats and sanctions. During 2005 and 2006, many monitoring reports casted doubt
on the reform process but no sanctions were imposed and membership was achieved.
This did not make EU demands seem very credible. Even though a great amount of
pre-accession funds were frozen in 2008 once membership was achieved it can al-
legedly be more difficult for the European institutions to blame and shame a fellow
member state and even impose more serious sanctions (Andreev 2009: 390). Fur-
thermore, problems with the judiciary are still prevalent in Commission Reports even
after the sanctions instrument has been in use. This poses the question whether the
sanctions are either too small in size to have an impact on shifting the domestic status
quo and surpassing eventual veto players, or if sanctions simply do not trigger reform
because Bulgaria does not take them serious?
Determinacy refers to the clarity of the rule as well as the legality of it. Determinacy
matters both because it helps the Bulgarian government know exactly what they have
to do to get the rewards, and it diminishes the opportunity to manipulate the rule
or avoid adopting it (Schimmelfennig 2005: 12-13). At the time of accession, Bulgaria
was still lacking important reform in several areas in the judiciary. As a response to the
insufficiencies and as part of the safeguard clauses, the Co-operation and Verification
Mechanism was established with the intention of closely monitoring the reform. Six
benchmarks for Bulgaria were set out:
1. Adopt Constitutional amendments removing any ambiguity regarding the inde-
pendence and accountability of the judicial system
2. Ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process by adopting and imple-
menting a new judicial system act and the new civil procedure code
3. Continue the reform of the judiciary in order to enhance professionalism, ac-
countability and efficiency. Evaluate the impact of this reform and publish the
results annually
4. Conduct and report on professional, non-partisan investigations into allega-
tions of high-level corruption. Report on internal inspections of public insti-
tutions and on the publication of assets of high-level officials
5. Take further measures to prevent and fight corruption, in particular at the bor-
ders and within local government
6. Implement a strategy to fight organised crime, focussing on serious crime, money
laundering as well as on the systematic confiscation and convictions in these ar-
eas
(Commission 2009d: 4-8)
Furthermore, the interim and annual reports prepared by the Commission under the
Co-operation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) monitor progress and identify the
needs for further action in order to fully live up to the benchmarks set out at the time
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of accession. The idea behind the CVM is explained in one of the Commissions mon-
itoring reports.
"The rationale for the CVM is not to establish a check-list, but to develop an indepen-
dent, stable judiciary which is able to detect and sanction conflicts of interests, combat
corruption at all levels and deal effectively with organized crime" (Commission 2009:
2).
But the benchmark approach and methodology utilized by the Commission poses
several questions about determinacy. The EU benchmark approach leaves many things
open to interpretation. What is for example meant by efficient judicial process? When
is a judicial process efficient? What is an "ambiguity regarding the independence of
the judicial"? These benchmarks lead the Commissions monitoring reports which ex-
emplify the problems in Bulgaria under each Benchmark, but they do not provide
specific measures and laws to tackle these problems, nor do they provide measurable
goals but rely on best practice through twinning projects and self reform initiatives.
We will now turn to a more thorough analysis of the implications of the benchmark
approach and the credibility and the size of EU sanctions and rewards.
5.2 EU pressure - Sanctions and Credibility
Bulgarian political elites have found it difficult to reconcile their pro-European rhetoric
with the implementation of a reform agenda capable of meeting the considerable con-
ditionality attached to the enlargement process (Papadimitriou 2009: 1). Enlargement
through the Bulgarian case offers a critical test- case to the thesis of enlargement led
Europeanization. The EUs approach to Bulgaria has been dualistic. On the one hand
a rule- governed process built around the principle of conditionality, and on the other
hand, the preservation of a significant amount of discretion when it comes to the in-
terpretation and implementation of the rules (Papadimitriou 2009: 2). The outcome
of the first democratic elections in 1990 confirmed that much of the previous com-
munist order had remained intact. In a sense, Bulgaria failed to meet the first condi-
tionality requirement, namely a clean break from their communist past and the emer-
gence of reform minded governments (Papadimitriou 2009: 10).
Bulgaria’s ex communists remained in power after the parliamentary vote in June 1990
and were keen to preserve links with the Soviet Union. In December 1990, the Na-
tional Assembly of Bulgaria passed a resolution expressing its will to become a mem-
ber of the European Community. But when it came to reform of the country there
were serious doubts of credibility from the Western Community.
Economic ties between Bulgaria and EU where created in May 1990 with the signa-
ture of a trade and cooperation agreement. This year, Bulgaria was also included in
the PHARE program and by 1995, the country was receiving 476.5 million Euros. In
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1992, the EU negotiated a more comprehensive Association Agreement with a spe-
cial clause on respect for human rights and democratic principles (Noutcheva and
Bechev 2008: 118). By the mid 1990s, the EU was Bulgaria’s main trading partner, ac-
counting for more than half of imports and exports. The Europe Agreement stated
explicitly the goal of EU membership, and the specific conditions were specified in
December 1993 under the Copenhagen European Council. This created the founda-
tion for the use of conditionality later in the pre-accession process. Bulgaria applied
for membership in 1995, and the Commission issued its first opinion on the coun-
try’s application in 1997. In contrary to most other membership aspiring countries,
Bulgaria did not initiate reform until it was sanctioned either by the market or the
exclusion effects of conditionality (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008:119-120). In the pe-
riod 1997-2004, the Commission further specified and tightened its conditions, using
its monitoring mechanisms to criticize institutional practices and demand improve-
ments, especially the quality of governance and the rule of law were judged unsatis-
factory. Accession talks commenced in 2000, and can be seen both an attempt to re-
ward Bulgaria reform centre-right government’s support during the Kosovo war and to
stabilize the southeastern region of Europe. November 2002, a detailed roadmap was
presented and adopted by the Copenhagen European Council, identifying remaining
criteria for membership, increased financial assistance and with the objective of wel-
coming Bulgaria as a member of the EU in 2007 (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 119-
124). When closing the accession negotiations in 2004, three safeguard clauses where
adopted in the treaty, which allowed the Commission to suspend concrete benefits of
membership in the first three years of accession (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 125).
In 2005, Bulgaria received the first warning letters, followed by a comprehensive mon-
itoring report which stated that sanctions would be imposed if deficiencies in sector
such as the judicial and anticorruption were not improved. These were confirmed in
the Monitoring report of 2006, but despite of these problems the Commission recom-
mended the accession of Bulgaria in 2007 (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 126).
It raises serious doubts of credibility that despite of Bulgaria not living up to the nec-
essary requirements it is admitted as a member. Several instruments where put in
use by the EU the period leading up to the accession date such as monitoring reports,
roadmaps, and at one point the EU threatening to postpone membership with one
year (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 134). But if these are not followed by exclusion or
sanctions they lose credibility and thus their effect.
After the accession, several problems have been detected in the different programs
under EU support, which have resulted in either withdrawal of local management
rights on aid programs, or the suspension of payments. OLAF (the European Com-
mission Anti-fraud office) has conducted investigations in cases involving PHARE and
SAPARD, and has pointed out some fundamental weaknesses in the Bulgarian admin-
istrative and judicial capacity12 The first sanctions came in February 2008 due to mis-
management and corruption in the Bulgarian Road Agency, and blocked funding from
12Novinite (24.02.10) http://www.novinite.com/viewn ew s.php?i d = 113541(l ast accessed09.04.10).
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ISPA. This resulted in the OLAF carrying out a series of audits and revealing corruption
on a serious scale including 50 Bulgarian companies and the Bulgarian government,
and resulted in the suspension of A˘560 million from the PHARE program and A˘144
million from the ISPA program (Trauner 2009: 19). Furthermore, they withdrew the
accreditation of two Bulgarian agencies responsible for the management of EU pre-
accession funds (Commission 2008: 3). But in spite of continuous monitoring reports
criticizing Bulgarian efforts in the reform process of the judiciary no new sanctions
have been imposed and only broad recommendations have been made in order to put
pressure on Bulgaria (Commission 2010: 2-8). This poses a serious question whether
the sanctions or the threat of sanction are big enough to foster reform. The theoret-
ical argument of sanctions should be that the cost of not receiving EU funds should
be bigger than performing the necessary reform in order to receive them. As we will
show in the next analysis the problems in the judiciary persist. This could indicate
that the sanctions available, and funds stemming from the EU, are not large or cred-
ible enough to shift powers and overcome possible veto players and other mediating
factors in order to induce reform.
5.2.1 The shortcomings of the political strategy - Determinacy and
Capacity Building
The practice of technical and financial assistance has centered around the principle
of the money and men (MM) solution i.e. it is expected that EU rules will be effectively
applied and enforced in the candidate countries once sufficient and qualified staff is
hired and adequate amounts of resources are committed to the purposes. There are
several shortcomings to this approach. First it takes focus away from the problem of
capacity building13 , which is vital for lasting reform. Second, an approach which fails
to recognize that there are few absorption capacities e.g. lack of MM solutions and no
clear benchmarks, will be ineffective and might result in empowering national veto
players at the expense of reform-minded groups (Bozhilova 2007: 288-289).
In the absence of rules, the EU has formulated the area of judicial reform in two ways,
first as a political criterion and second as an acquis criterion under chapter 24, Jus-
tice and Home Affairs (JHA). But the contents of the latter can be described as thin,
lacking detailed regulation, and with no performance oriented benchmarks or quan-
titative targets for Bulgaria to address. The EU has no criminal law jurisdiction; it can-
not criminalize offences or impose criminal punishment for those. The logic behind
the integration is that member states are the only agents and operators of facilities,
institutions, and policies which amount to the effect of the criminal law administra-
tion. The thinness of the acquis in this area of JHA means the EU has developed very
13Capacity building refers to a process of deliberate interventions with three main purposes.
These are: upgrading skills, to improve procedures, and strengthen organizations. Capacity building
works through investment in people, institutions and practices that helps enable countries to achieve
their development objectives. When such activities contribute to the achievement of the national
goals and donor aid dependence decreases, capacity has been built effectively (World Bank Glossary:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPSIA/0„print:Y isCURL:Y content-
MDK:20433436 menuPK:2453409 pagePK:210058 piPK:210062 theSitePK:490130,00.html (last accessed 09.04.10)).
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few capacities of its own to generate capacities in other words positive integration
(Bozhilova 2007: 290). The Benchmark methodology set up under the Co-operation
and Verification Mechanism was introduced earlier in this analysis and has a clear
lack of determinacy leaving interpretation of scope and content and end goals up to
interpretation and thus provides a vague framework for reform. The current focus of
the EU methods on legal integration is problematic in the Bulgarian case, because
it doesn’t have the prerequisite institutional capacities to implement desired reforms
(Bozhilova 2007: 290). As we will show in the third part of the analysis there is a dis-
tinct culture of hierarchy and a great number of veto players in the judiciary, which
poses a great problem to this specific EU approach.
As part of the Helsinki summit in 1999, the EU put as a requirement for accession
that Bulgaria should develop appropriate policies and methods to fight corruption.
Furthermore, it expected Bulgaria to build an institutional structure to accompany
and enable the implementation of an anti-corruption strategy. But EU has no clearly
formulated policies to fight corruption, the acquis is next to none developed in this
area and in terms of best practice for institutional structures’ development it doesn’t
provide sufficient help either. As a solution, the EU made it a condition for Bul-
garia to adopt the International Conventions on corruption14 unconditionally, even
though this is not part of the acquis as not all member states have ratified them.
The other part of the solution was to provide assistance through PHARE and an ex-
change of best practices through several twinning15 partners16 (Bozhilova 2007: 297-
298). What is worth noting here is that only few of these resources went to institution-
building projects, which were neglected for the sake of technical assistance and sup-
ply (Bozhilova 2007: 303). Most of the projects were long overdue when Bulgaria be-
came a member in 2007, which in essence means that funds have not been disbursed
and the reforms have not taken place. This again opens the question of credibility,
when there is no consequence of not carrying through twinning projects, which in
essence should be considered as a misuse of EU funds. Furthermore, the reliance on
the best practice instrument in order to reform the judiciary lacks a great deal of deter-
minacy. Even though these projects have to be approved by the Commission17 it is up
14The United Nations Convention of Corruption entered into force on 14 of December 2005 and the pur-
pose of the Convention is to promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more ef-
ficiently and effectively; to promote, facilitate, and support international cooperation and technical assis-
tance in the prevention of and fight against corruption; and to promote integrity, accountability, and proper
management of public affairs and public property (The United Nations Convention of Corruption: Art. 1:
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publicationsu nodcc onventi on−e.pd f (l ast accessed14.04.10)).
15 Twinning is a demand-driven instrument, where it is up to Bulgaria to apply for this kind of
assistance financed by the Commission. When Bulgaria decides to ask for a twinning project in a
certain area, the Commission outsources the projects and member state can apply before a certain
deadline. The different project proposals are the presented to Bulgaria, which chooses the one it
finds most suitable (European Commission 4: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/how-does-it-work/technical-
assistance/twinninge n.htm(l ast accessed09.04.10)).
1614 projects were conducted between 1999-2007 through the PHARE program. On average, EUR 9.291.215
were spent on this area through PHARE and National co-funding facilities. Most were used on twinning projects,
where one third of each projects budget is spent on foreign counselors, and less than an average of EUR 1.000.000
per year were spent on institution-building (Bozhilova 2007: 303).
17The Commission draws up the legal, financial and procedural framework of the twinning exercises, whereas
their specific priorities and targets are set in collaboration with the delegations in the candidate country (Papadim-
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 56
to the Bulgarian actors to decide the area and scope of reform (Papadimitrou 2002: 9).
The EU has highlighted that an important part of integration in Bulgaria is an effective
project supervision and management. Over the years, EU funded projects in Bulgaria
have been implemented under supervision of the same persons. This could open the
question if part of the accession partnership between EU and Bulgaria is rooted in
the Bulgarian supervision and implementation of the projects? It is a weakness of
the PHARE that is has not introduced a rotational institutional structure in the imple-
mentation of projects. The principle of rotation is common practice in EU governance
and could be suitable tool to increase transparency and accountability, and promote
knowledge and ability through inclusion of the greatest number of actors (Bozhilova
2007: 307). The external incentives model is essentially a promotion of knowledge
and capacity through incentives. But if resources are insufficient, badly managed and
targeted mainly on policy reform over capacity building, its cost-benefit orientation is
likely to be inverted.
Other important issues to consider are the problems of the twinning method which
have to do with the effectiveness of knowledge absorption capacity and the sustain-
ability of intervention after twinning. The absorption capacity stems from human
capital and financial constraints. The quality of commitment of the individuals in-
voked is central to its success or failure. This is problematic due to low wages and
moral as well as an overburdened Bulgarian public administration. Furthermore, civil
servants are over burdened and often lack competence in the specific area related to
the twinning project (Bailey 2004: 86).
5.2.2 Twinning - the case of the Magistrate Training Centre
As noted above, the EU assigns a vast proportion of its resources to the twinning
mechanism. It is thus interesting to go deeper into the possibilities and limitations
of this mechanism through a concrete case, namely the effect of twinning projects
between Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature (ENM)18 providing judicial education in
the Magistrate training centre.
As part of the process of enlargement, the EU has set up financial incentives and cog-
nitive resources to foster judicial reforms in the candidate countries and, in particular,
to reshape the system of judicial education. The pressure is cognitive and normative.
The normative approach to the functioning of the judiciary can be summarized in two
points: It represents a way of dealing with conflicts, and the law must be correctly ap-
plied, which judges are entrusted with the task of doing (Piana 2007:33).
When the pre-accession process started, the European Commission asked Bulgaria
that the judicial staff should learn the corpus juris and the acquis communitaire and
itriou 2002: 9).
18Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature is the French National School for the Judiciary (École nationale de la
magistrature: http://www.enm.justice.fr/anglais/home.php (last accessed 30.04.10)).
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be adequately trained in order to work cooperatively within the European legal space
(Piana 2007: 40). Since 1998, the training of judges and prosecutors has been strongly
supported by the European Union through the twinning exercise. Therefore, the twin-
ning projects have represented a model for exporting patterns of behavior, proce-
dures, and rules. The channel opened by the European Commission is therefore a
specific incentive for candidate governments to enact policy transfer and to intention-
ally adopt exogenous policy inputs to achieve better policy making at home. Twin-
ning goes beyond the coercion of political conditionality, providing normative inputs
aimed at promoting democracy and the rule of law through social learning and lesson
drawing. Judicial training is a key condition allowing judicial actors to be independent
from possible influence by political and corporate power (Piana 2007:40).
Piana examines the transfer of the French model between the Ecole Nationale de la
Magistrature and The Magistrate Training Centre now known as the National Institute
of Justice. The Magistrate Training Centre originally started as a non-profit organi-
zation through USAID funding, and was in 2004 turned into the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ). It is responsible for maintaining and furthering the qualifications of
junior magistrates19 Piana finds that once domestic factors enter the picture the con-
tents of training and the organization of education should be considered separately.
The content of training through a transfer of the catalogue of courses has taken place
in Bulgaria. But there has only been a partial adoptation of the organizational model.
When it comes to the contents of training, the French model of judicial education
has been driven by a mechanism of imitation. But the organizational model has not
followed due to the powerful and autonomous position if the Supreme Judicial Coun-
cil, which hinders the establishment of a fully independent and autonomous judicial
school (Piana 2007: 53).
Furthermore, Piana finds through a comparative analysis that social learning through
these paths of transfer in CEEC’s depends strongly on actors who were given power
over judicial education before pre-accession as well as the existence of political and
financial resources. In countries where these actors have not been judicial actors they
have presented facilitating conditions favoring the imitation of the ENM, while the
contrary has happened in countries like Bulgaria, where the actor has been judicial
in this case the SJC, which has had full autonomy in this area, and very few resources
attributed (Piana 2007: 48). This shows that the twinning mechanism is week when it
comes to capacity building especially in an environment with strong veto players. The
twinning mechanism lacks determinacy and leaves it up to the actors to implement
and control the assistance at will to fit the already existing institutional structure. Fur-
thermore, the resources attributed to these projects might result in empowering veto
players rather than reform minded actors.
19The National Institute of Justice: http://www.nij.bg/Articles/Articles.aspx?lang=en-USpageid=498 (last ac-
cessed 14.04.10).
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5.2.3 Preliminary Conclusion
If compliance is costly and non-compliance is not easily observed by the EU, it could
be expected and has been the case that Bulgaria will simply not comply. The only
framework of punishment, namely the safeguard clauses have no correlation to ca-
pacity building and are in essence measures of negative integration. Adding to this the
EU resources committed to reform of the rule of law in Bulgaria seem to insufficient in
amount and poorly managed in scope. Combined with the precedence given to policy
over institutional reform and the unclear determinacy of the content of benchmarks
and the best practice instrument, it may not be able to reach the task of reducing the
high number veto players in the judiciary. In the absence of measures to hinder non-
compliance or circumvention other than the safety clauses, veto players might end
up being empowered at the expense of the seemingly civil and political consensus in
favor of European integration. Both the former and the later will be examined in the
third part of the analysis.
5.3 Establishing the misfit
In this section we wish to determine in which areas problems occur when attempting
to reform the Bulgarian judiciary. This is done by analyzing three different kinds of
misfit - legal, organizational, and cultural misfit. By distinguishing between different
kinds of misfit, we are able to enhance our accuracy in identifying the areas, which
are preventing Bulgaria from reform in the judicial system. In accordance with our
research strategy, establishing the misfit is an important part of our analysis of judicial
reform as it is the prerequisite for any real change (Risse 2002:618). We will begin with
the legal misfit.
5.3.1 Legal Misfit
Analyzing the legal misfit implies investigating whether transposition of EU law has
taken place in Bulgaria. This can be done through the Commission’s transposition
and infringement data, although several researchers have criticized this set of data
(Börzel 2001:820, Knill 2006:358) as not being complete, because it requires adminis-
trative resources to measure and control compliance - resources that Bulgaria may not
possess. This part of our analysis, however, mainly deals with formal reforms, which
is why the data will be included along with the Commission’s monitoring reports. The
findings will later be correlated with our empirical findings.
In regards to the formal transposition of EU legislation, Bulgaria has undoubtedly per-
formed very well. When it comes to the internal market legislation, Bulgaria achieved
a transposition deficit of 0.3 pct. as of May 2009 (Commission 2009e:13). This means
that Bulgaria has transposed almost all internal market directives within the prede-
fined deadlines - only surpassed by Denmark and Malta (Commission 2009e: 13).
Moreover, Bulgaria’s general transposition rate went from 98.46 pct. in March 2007
to 99.39 pct. in January 2009, ranking it in sixth place of the EU-27 (Trauner 2009: 15).
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If we look on the infringement data the picture is similar. Bulgaria received 80 letters
of formal notice, in 2007 (Commission 2008c: 10) and only 38 in 2008 (Commission
2009c:10), which is the first step in the infringement procedure20 and in case it re-
mains unsettled is referred to the European Court of Justice (Commission 2009c:10).
Infringement data show that Bulgaria is ranking sixth in EU27 when it comes to least
amount of infringement cases (Commission 2009b: annex). So far, in regards to trans-
position of the acquis, things are going well for Bulgaria. Implementation and en-
forcement, however, is a different story.
The fact that formal transposition does not reflect the reality of implementation of
EU law can be seen in the monitoring reports from the Commission, which stress
the role of the judiciary - "institutions look good on paper but do not produce results
in practice"(Commission 2008b: 5). Significant success has been achieved in harmo-
nizing Bulgarian legislation with the acquis, but its application is ineffective, espe-
cially because the public administration is suffering under close links between civil
servants and politicians and organized crime. Political corruption and ties between
the state apparatus and private business undermine the public trust in state institu-
tions. Another factor which inhibits the enforcement of the acquis is the dysfunctional
judiciary. The Bulgarian judicial system is characterized by long lasting trials that go
on for years, overcrowded prisons, and low accountability of the judiciary which, at
times, uses its independence to pursue political purposes (Trauner 2009: 13-14). The
last factor, creating problems in enforcing EU law, is the lack of social activism. There
is a low engagement of citizens in civic and political life, due to a widespread disbelief
of the functioning of state institutions. It is perceived as being more cost effective to
bribe a government official, policeman and the like, instead of taking someone to trial
or doing the official procedure - "[b]ribery has become the principle mode of solving
problems in Bulgaria while the law no longer serves as the chief regulator of society"
(Trauner 2009: 14).
The legal misfit in formal transposition of EU law does not seem to provide an ad-
equate area of investigation in order to understand the shortcomings of the Bulgarian
judiciary. The next area of analyses will be the organizational misfit.
5.3.2 Organizational misfit
In our analysis of the organizational misfit, we will focus on the formal institutional
set-up and the inter-institutional relationship between the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary, i.e. the separation of powers. Investigating the organizational mis-
fit is important because it can generate opposition for real change. If an organiza-
tional misfit of exists in the judicial system, a modification of this may entail every-
thing from; slight modifications, completely new organizations or severe structural
changes. This can then lead to change of interest in all the affected actors. Hence, al-
ready established interests are disturbed, and actors who have invested in a particular
20The letter of formal notice is the first step in the infringement procedure and implies that the Commission
demands Bulgaria to submit its observation on an identified legal problem (Commission 2009c:10).
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organizational setting may not wish change to come about.
When the Council defined the three accession criteria in 1993 at the Copenhagen Eu-
ropean Council it stated that "accession will take place as soon as an associated country
is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and politi-
cal conditions required21". Three criteria were presented, one of them being "stability
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
and protection of minorities22".
The Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 does confess to the ’rule of law’, at least formally,
by declaring that it is a "law governed state [...] governed by the Constitution and the
laws of the country" (Constitution of Bulgaria: Art. 4). But what does the ’rule of law’
mean in the context of the accession criteria and why is it so important that Bulgaria
complete reform of the public administrative system and the judiciary in order to live
fully up to the criteria?
It is not possible to make a precise definition of the term ’rule of law’. Different coun-
tries and different legal traditions define the term differently but in general,
"the "rule of law" can be understood as a legal-political regime under which the law
restrains the state and its authorities - legislative, executive and judicial - by promot-
ing certain liberties and creating order and predictability in how a country functions"
(Roos 2007:2).
’Rule of law’ is a system which guards the citizens’ rights against arbitrary and abusive
use of government power, and is thereby a central component of a democratic system
and thus a functioning member state. Formally one could say, that as long as the ex-
ecutive is bound by the ’rule of law’, and acts according to the law, the substance of
the law does not matter. This is, however, not the case. In order to make the concept
work in a democratic society, substantive meaning must be given to the concept, so
that the laws which are being adhered to fulfill some requirements, the most impor-
tant being fundamental human rights (Roos 2007:2-3). This is why the EU spends vast
amounts of resources on reform in Bulgaria. Other areas related to transposition of
the acquis may seriously influence the Unions ability to function as a single market,
but without a functioning administrative and judicial system the very building blocks
of the state are in jeopardy and not only the political elites are affected but whole so-
cieties (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008:127).
A ’rule of law state’, furthermore, include some basic elements. Among these is the
separation of powers23 Article 8 of the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 stipulates that
21European Commission on enlargement: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/acces-
sion_process/criteria/index_en.htm (last accessed 23.03.10).
22European Commission on enlargement: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/acces-
sion_process/criteria/index_en.htm (last accessed 23.03.10).
23In the 18th century the French scholar and political philosopher Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu
(1689-1775) developed his famous model for the governance of modern states - The separation of powers or ’Trias
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"[t]he power of the State shall be divided between legislative, executive and judicial
branches" (Constitution of Bulgaria 1991: Art. 8). This was the first time in the history
of Bulgaria that it was understood as such. Previously, the Constitution of Tarnovo
of 1879 gave the king the majority of powers and the Communist Constitutions of
1947 and 1971 did nothing to change the overall picture of this - the Popular Assem-
bly held the total power instead of the king - and the Communist Party was soon to
take full power of all institutions (Frison-Roche and Sodev 2005:596). The majority of
judges, especially high-level court judges were members of the Communist Party, and
the party leaders were deemed above the law and were thus beyond the reach of the
law (American Bar Association 2006: 6).
A vital part of the separation of power is the independence of the judiciary - "any
personal and functional interaction between the judiciary and the two other branches
is strictly forbidden" (Roos 2007:4). By becoming a State Party to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Bulgaria has recognized that
every individual has the right to a trial by an independent and impartial tribunal24.
The EU has focused largely on the independence and accountability of the judicial
system. The EU has no specific model on how this should function but relies on
a normative idea of what characterizes the basic properties of member states sys-
tems, namely a system of checks and balances. In a system of checks and balances
the different branches have their specifically assigned task but neither can operate
without the other and their powers are therefore limited. Moreover, the focus on who
does what is not as stringent in systems of checks and balances, so even though each
branch prioritises its own basic functions, the branches are still very much aware of
the fact that they cannot operate without the others, most constitutions are a mix of
both the principle of the separation of powers and the principle of checks and bal-
ances (Sajó 1999:75). The first of the benchmarks under the Co-operation and Veri-
fication Mechanism stating that constitutional amendments should be made remov-
ing any ambiguity regarding the independence and accountability of the judicial sys-
tem has been under close scrutiny by the Commission and although much progress
has been made, much is still left wanted three years after accession. It is not always
straight forward to ensure that both independence and checks are present in a con-
stitutional system. After the fall of communism in 1991, Bulgaria adopted a primary
law given total independence to the judiciary. This lead to problems of corruption
and impunity, exemplified by embezzlement cases continuously being delayed and
vast amounts of suspected contract killings, where no one were ever convicted de-
Politica’. The theory is inspired by John Locke (1632-1704) and is built upon the British constitutional system,
which Montesquieu was an admirer of. The state is divided into branches that each has separate and individual
powers and areas of responsibility - the executive (the government - day to day management of the state), legisla-
tive (make laws) and judicial (interpret laws). The idea is that a system of checks and balances is hereby created -
a system where each branch has the ability to check each other and balance the others’ powers. Montesquieu be-
lieved, that although the branches are separated they are still interdependent in the sense that they cannot operate
on their own and one sovereign and absolutism will be prevented (Salzberger and Voigt 2009: 197).
24 In Art 6 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms it is stated:
"[E]veryone is entitled to at fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law".
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spite many links being made public in the Bulgarian Press. In an attempt to counter
the events, the Bulgarian parliament in March 2006 passed amendments limiting the
independence of the judiciary by giving the parliament the power to dismiss the chief
prosecutor and judges25. The EU responded that this was a violation of the indepen-
dence of the judiciary and called for a removal of any ambiguities in the Bulgarian
primary law. Too much independence is, however, also in violation of the principle of
checks and balances. Academics point out (Schönfelder 2005: 61) that the Bulgarian
judiciary has a very high degree of independence but if the people are not collecting
any of the benefits, the democratic system has failed - judicial independence is a priv-
ilege and the right of the people in a democratic state based on the ’rule of law’, not a
privilege of judges (Roos: 2007:5).
The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was assigned the task of monitoring the judi-
ciary without infringing on its independence. The SJC was given power to dismiss,
appoint, promote, demote and reassign judges, prosecutors and investigating mag-
istrates (Constitution of Bulgaria 1991: Art. 129(1)), and thereby limiting the power
of the parliament. The SJC, however, does not function without problems. Stories of
corruption26 and untimely bonuses27 has not helped the popularity of the SJC and
recently the Bulgarian Justice Minister and Interior Minister have called for reform -
11 out of 25 members are elected by Parliament28, a number which, according to the
ministers, provide protection for figures of organised crime29. In an attempt to fulfil
the requirements, the SJC has a monitoring function in that it has an Inspectorate,
which carries out inventories and analyses of specific cases. More specifically, The
Inspectorate investigates disciplinary violations and systematic weaknesses of the ju-
dicial practise. The aim is to unify the practises and pinpoint how individual cases
can be sped up and thereby tackle one of the EUs most serious concerns i.e. "unrea-
sonable delays in judicial proceedings" (Commission 2009:4). According to the EU, the
reasons for the delays can be found in the criminal procedure, which is characterized
by excessive formalism30, passivity of the bench and many openings for defendants
to stall the proceedings (Commission 2009:4). Tackling the major delays is an impor-
tant part of the second benchmark of the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism
- to ensure a more transparent and efficient judicial process. One of the most promi-
nent cases is against Mario Nikolov who is charged with document fraud and misuse
of SAPARD European agriculture funds of the amount of 7.5 million euro. The trial
25RTE news (02.02.07): http://www.rte.ie/news/2007/0202/eu.html (last accessed 23.03.10)
26In the summer of 2009 several members of the SJC were allegedly involved in a corruption scheme. Novinite
(08.11.09): http://www.novinite.com/viewn ew s.php?i d = 108645(l ast accessed23.03.10)
27In December 2009, the SJC voted for bonuses to themselves for their services to the judiciary. The bonuses
were later withdrawn. The Sofia Echo (24.12.09): http://sofiaecho.com/2009/12/24/835342s upr eme− j udi ci al−
counci l s− chr i stmas−bonus−pl an− g i ven−death− sentence(l ast accessed23.03.10)
28Supreme Judicial Council’s website: http://www.vss.justice.bg/en/history.htm (last accessed 24.03.10)
29SETimes website http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/enG B/new sbr i e f s/set i mes/new s-
br i e f s/2010/03/18/nb−13(l ast accessed23.03.10)
30The idea behind legal formalism is a strict following of ’black letter law’ - the words of the law is followed
strictly. Opposed to this is legal instrumentalism, which believes that legal rules should be interpreted in the light
of their purpose (Legal Theory Lexicon (22.05.05)http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-
lexicon-043-formalism-and.html (last accessed 24.03.10))
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against Nikolov began in February 2009 and has since been delayed several times, re-
cently in March 2010 where it was delayed twice. The first time due to the absence of
one of the defence layers31 and secondly due to the absence of one of the jury mem-
bers, who happened to work at the Interior Ministry32. The case has received attention
not only for the large amount of EU funds involved but also because several of the im-
plicated, including Mario Nikolov, were sponsors of President Parvanov’s campaign at
the last presidential election. Even though the trial began in the beginning of 2009,
the case was investigated as early as 2007 and became high-profile in 2008, when a
report by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) was leaked to the Bulgarian media,
making the alleged fraud public33.
There are clear traces of organizational misfit in the Bulgarian judicial system. The
system of checks and balances is not in place as the judiciary enjoys too little checks.
New organizational instruments have already been set up in order to control the ju-
diciary but there is still lacking substantial power behind the SJC, or the power is not
being used, to push through major reform of the judicial system.
5.3.3 Cultural misfit
The final part of our misfit analysis deals with cultural misfit. We will focus on corrup-
tion, and draw on statistics regarding the public perception. A culture of corruption
in the Bulgarian judiciary and the other parts of the State body would mean a clear
misfit and pose a serious problem for reform of the judicial system. We do not intent
to attempt measuring any degree of corruption in Bulgaria, nor will we claim that the
system as a whole is corrupt. The aim of this section is rather to uncover some of the
problems, which could be hindering the reform process.
Corruption
Much of the EUs focus on Bulgaria has dealt with corruption. The benchmarks made
before the accession included two on corruption and it was clear that the EU took the
problems very seriously (see section 5.1.1). In the reports from the Commission on
the progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism it is re-
peatedly stated that progress is not happening quickly enough. Bulgaria is applauded
for setting up measures to fight corruption but these are not properly implemented
and are thereby not yielding results;
31The defence layer Yordan Kitov had told the Sofia City Court that he had a scheduling conflict and needed
to be at the Burgas Appellate Court on the Black Sea coast. According to Kitov he had notified the court in
Burgas about the conflict but that this had requested his presence due to it being a higher court. The SJC
inquired with the court in Burgas, who replied that no such notification had taken place (Novinite (24.03.10)
http://www.vss.justice.bg/en/history.htm (last accessed 24.03.10))
32The juror Snezha Proynova was sent on a working trip by her employer the Interior Min-
istry even though the possible trial dates had been announced in advance (Novinite (15.03.10)
http://www.novinite.com/viewn ew s.php?i d = 114199(l ast accessed24.03.10)
33Novinite (04.03.10) http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=113832 (last accessed 24.03.10) and Novi-
nite (17.06.09) http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=104754 (last accessed 24.03.10)
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"Considerable efforts have gone into setting up institutions and processes. However,
this reform has not yet produced sufficient results [...] the laws have to be implemented
and the institutions have to work effectively to produce more concrete results" (Com-
mission 2008b:3).
In the report from July 2009, the Commission also strike a blow; "[...] steps are con-
fined to the technical level and have limited impact" (Commission 2009:7). The report
furthermore states that earlier steps have had an effect albeit limited. The judicial sys-
tem is accentuated as lacking behind - "a profound reform of the judiciary has still not
started". This is especially important in the light of corruption because surveys show
that the Bulgarian public views the judicial system as being the most corrupt sector,
which will be discussed later in this section.
But what is corruption and why is it such a problem for the judicial system?
No uniform definition of corruption exists and there are disagreements as to how the
term is to be defined internationally. In 2003, the UN attempted to create agreement
albeit without success34. Transparency International, which is an internationally rec-
ognized organization that publishes surveys and reports on corruption worldwide,
has defined corruption as "[...] the abuse of entrusted power for private gain"35 . More-
over, Transparency International differentiate between ’according to rule’ corruption
and ’against the rule’ corruption36 . The first refers to cases where the receiver of a
bribe is paid to give preferential treatment, either negative or positive, within an area
where the receiver legally has authority. This could be a case where a prosecutor stalls
a case. ’Against the rule’ corruption refers to bribes, which are given for actions, which
the receiver of the bribe does not have authority to perform. This could be instances
where an investigating magistrate destroys or manufactures evidence. ’According to
the rule’ corruption is important in relation to the Bulgarian judiciary. One of the
main concerns of the EU is the severe delays, sometimes abusive delays, reported by
the SJC (Commission 2010:4). It is important to mention that so far no one has been
convicted of such charges. ’Against the rule’ corruption, unfortunately, is not rare in
the Bulgarian judiciary. In April 2010, a Sofia City Court judge was suspended from
his post for allegedly taking bribes. The case involves a former Defense Minister and a
former Finance Minister, who were both arrested for attempting to bribe investigators
and expert witnesses37.
The transparency of the judicial system is particularly important. Without transparency,
the public, as well as NGOs, the EU, the Bulgarian government or the Parliament,
have no real knowledge of what is going on. According to USAID, transparency can
help prevent interference in court operations (USAID 2002:2). Furthermore, if the
34United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Press briefing (31.10.03)
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2003/costatouq.doc.htm (last accessed 14.04.10)
35Transparency International 1: http://www.transparency.org/about_us (last accessed 14.04.10)
36Transparency International 2: http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq (last accessed
14.04.10)
37Novinite (08.04.10): http://www.novinite.com/viewn ew s.php?i d = 115012(l ast accessed14.04.10).
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records are managed properly and the judicial decisions are published, the assign-
ment of cases can be kept party-neutral and rulings based on other interests than law
and facts can be deterred. The media play an important role in a transparent judicial
system - as do academics and NGOs - in that they can expose and deter abuse of the
system and help install faith in the judiciary (USAID 2002:2-3).
The costs connected to corruption are political, economic, and social. Politically, cor-
ruption is a major obstacle for democracy and the ’rule of law’ because in a demo-
cratic system, institutions lose their legitimacy when they are being used for private
gain. And even though corruption is damaging in a fully established democracy, it is
even more damaging in a new (National Anti-Corruption Strategy: 1). Responsible po-
litical leadership cannot unfold itself in a corrupt climate. Economic corruption leads
to a hollowing out of national prosperity and is often responsible for scarce public re-
sources being channelled to high profile projects like water dams, power plants, and
refineries instead on projects with smaller but vital infrastructure profiles like schools,
hospitals, roads, or power and water supply to the rural districts. Furthermore, the
development of fair market structures is held back and the competition is distorted,
which leads to fewer investments (National Anti-Corruption Strategy: 1). The social
impact of corruption in the social networks of the society is perhaps most harmful.
The people’s trust in the political system, the institutions and the governing of soci-
ety is being undermined. Frustration and general apathy in a disillusioned popula-
tion leads to a weak civil society. Additionally, despots and democratically elected,
but none the less scruple less, leaders can turn national actives into personal wealth.
To demand and pay a bribe becomes the norm, and persons unwilling to follow this
norm emigrate - in this way a country is drained of its most honest and able citizens.
We do not believe that the situation in Bulgaria is quite so bad but one could ask
if Bulgaria does not have a culture of corruption. Numerous cases38 exist of trusted
members of the government branches, including the judiciary, using their position for
a personal gain. National Strategies for fighting corruption have been made, promises
have been made by Prime Ministers and demands have been made by the EU. Still, no
ground breaking progress has been made and the Bulgarian people have less trust in
the government branches than ever. Eurobarometer-data show that from 2006-2009
the percentage of the Bulgarians who had trust in their own government dropped
from 24 pct. to 17 pct. In comparison, the average of the EU has only dropped overall
3 pct. and is currently 32 pct. The Bulgarian parliament does not fare any better. After
the accession in 2007, the statistics have dropped drastically and only 10 pct of Bul-
garians said that they had trust in their national parliament - a number which is 22
38In the summer of 2009, allegations of trade in influence and corruption in relation to high-ranking appoint-
ments in the judiciary were made public. Krassimir Georgiev, a young business man was reportedly selling se-
nior jobs as a magistrate for the amount of 200,000 Euros. Three people were demoted, despite media specu-
lation about heavier sanctions (Sofia Echo (16.04.10) http://sofiaecho.com/2010/04/16/888331_us-ambassador-
fix-the-system-mr-prime-minister (last accessed 21.04.10)). Other stories include a former Deputy Interior
Minister (Novinite (12.04.10) http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=115153 (last accessed 21.04.10)), -
a mayor (Novinite (20.04.10) http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=115422 (last accessed 21.04.10), -
and a former director of the Bulgarian State Agriculture Fund and the SAPARD Agency (Novinite (18.03.10)
http://www.novinite.com/viewn ew s.php?i d = 114352(l ast accessed21.04.10))
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Bulgaria EU27/EU25
2006 2007 2008 2009 2006 2007 2008 2009
Trust in national
government 24% 22% 17% 17% 35% 41% 32% 32%
Trust in national
parliament 36% 14% 12% 10% 38% 43% 34% 32%
Trust in national legal
system 20% na 13% 14% 48% na 46% 48%
Source: Eurobarometer 65 2006; Eurobarometer 67 2007; Eurobarometer 69 2008; Eurobarometer 71
2009. *In 2007, the Eurobarometer poll did not include "trust in the legal system"
pct. below the EU27 average of 32 pct. Trust in the legal system in the EU27 is quite
high - in fact it is the most trusted of the national institutions. Topping the list are
the Nordic countries, headed by Denmark on 81 pct while the bottom is dominated
by Central and Eastern European countries (Eurobarometer 2009b:73). Bulgaria is the
country where citizens have the least amount of trust in the legal system, 14 pct.
In the latest survey from Transparency International, The Global Corruption Barom-
eter 2009, shows that the sector39 perceived to be most corrupt is the judiciary with 38
pct. (Transparency International 2009:30). Moreover, according to the survey, Bulgar-
ian judiciary is perceived to be the most corrupt in the entire EU. Along with Roma-
nia, Bulgaria is the only EU country to receive more than 4 on the corruption index
(1: not at all corrupt, 5: extremely corrupt) (Transparency International 2009:28). Fur-
thermore, the Bulgarian public do not have much faith in the government’s way of
tackling the corruption problems - only 10 pct. believe the actions of the (at the time
of the survey) current government in the fight against corruption is effective while 76
pct. believe it to de directly ineffective (Transparency International 2009: 33).
As the numbers have show, it is not only the EU that has concerns about the Bul-
garian judiciary. The concerns are shared by the public and this is crucial because
in order to have a well functioning state and a proper implementation of EU law, a
country has to have a strong but also reliable legislature (Crombois 2008:459).
5.3.4 Preliminary conclusion
By splitting the misfit into three separate sections - the legal, organizational, and cul-
tural misfit - we have found that two of the areas should be looked further into. Al-
most all EU legislation has been transposed but actual change has only happened to
a limited extent. Much of the work of the judiciary is not being properly checked or
balanced due to the organizational structure. The culture of the judiciary system is
also important. Corruption scandals involving the judiciary continuously emerge in
the media, seriously discrediting all of the government branches.
39The included sectors are: political parties; the parliament; the private sector; public officials; and the judi-
ciary (Transparency International 2009: 6).
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5.4 Mediating factors and institutional legacies
After having analyzed the EU pressure for reform and established that misfit exists, we
now turn to the domestic side of things. This section of the analysis has two parts. The
first brings in a historical institutionalist angle on change and stability by examining
the development of new and old institutions, which constitute the judicial system and
their potential of reform. The analysis will mainly center on the choices made in the
democratization process in the beginning of transition with special attention on the
independence of the judiciary and the reinstatement of communist magistrates in the
new judiciary institutions. Socialization will likewise be a focal point. We find that the
socialization process is mainly superficial and that the norms and values of the EU are
not yet rooted. The second part of this section deals with veto-points and institutional
structures. The path of non-reform of the judiciary has advantages for rent-seeking
elites who are unwilling to undermine the sources of their domestic power by intro-
ducing transparency and accountability in policy making. The question is whether the
EU rules are able to penetrate deep enough into the domestic governance structures
of Bulgaria to change the nature of its political and judiciary institutions. We find a
political environment of conflict rather than consensus which seems to lack reform
willingness and is focused on short term interests. Furthermore, the independence of
the judiciary and veto players, such as the Constitutional Court, combined with the
immunity of magistrates is hindering reform progress.
5.4.1 The communist legacy and democratization
When the Soviet regime fell in 1989, many countries found themselves facing a diffi-
cult democratization process. Some, like Poland and the Czech Republic, developed
fast partly because of the political and economic incentives given by EU (and NATO)
and partly due to geographical, historical and cultural closeness to Europe. In other
parts of the old regime, like the Central Asian former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, democratization came slow and even a promise of European inte-
gration may not have changed this (Pop-Eleches 2007:142-143). Bulgaria belongs to
neither of those groups. Rather, it is a ’borderline’ country with much ethnic diversity,
where the prospects of democratization were initially mixed (Pop-Eleches 2007:143).
Bulgaria has had a turbulent history; besides being part of the Soviet Union up un-
til 1989 in its earlier history it was under rule of the Ottoman Empire for more than
500 years as well as under pressure due to it’s allegiance to Nazi-Germany during the
Second World War.
After the end of the cold war, democracy and capitalism was introduced and the coun-
try approved a new constitution in 1991. Bulgaria’s economy suffered in the 1990s
with high inflation both due to lack of domestic reforms but also due to the war in the
former Yugoslavia and the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro by the UN,
which blocked the rail and road routes for Bulgarian international trade. In the late
1980s, Bulgaria had invested heavily in building new factories to serve other commu-
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nist markets and was thereby struck hard when the COMECON trading area collapsed,
resulting in a dramatic rise in unemployment (Grabbe 2004: 99).
Corruption was one of the major problems in the transition to democracy and mar-
ket economy (National Anti-Corruption Strategy: 1). The reason behind this was the
significant institutional weaknesses, a result from privatization of the government re-
sources, which left opportunities open for corruption for the former Communist elite,
resulting in a lack of trust in democracy in the population. In a transition period it
is vital that the elite of a society is behind reform as they can function as norm en-
trepreneurs and thereby, through persuasion and arguing, influence other members
of the political elite. In this way, new norms and behaviors can root and a process
of socialization can take place. A weak economy, underdeveloped institutions, and
uncertain international standing made the transition period difficult and the polit-
ical leaders needed strong incentives to embark on the new democratic path. The
perhaps strongest incentives for complying with Western democratic standards were
economic - Bulgaria needed access to foreign aid, favorable terms of trade, and for-
eign loans. Membership of international organizations such as the EU and NATO also
played a major factor, both for economic and geopolitical reasons but also for fear
of being an outcast. Moreover, membership would mean a seal of approval from the
EU and NATO, a seal which would send an important signal to the population who
perceived the international organizations as more trustworthy than their domestic
political institutions (Pop-Eleches 2007:144-45). These benefits of membership were
therefore viewed as being greater than the costs - or in other words, the costs of not
joining the EU were too great. Without membership, Bulgaria would not have access
to the internal market; it would very likely be vulnerable to Russian influence; and it
would not receive millions of Euros for development.
The EU has actively worked to create a link between democracy, the EU, and eco-
nomic prosperity - a process, which in large parts has it’s origins in a logic of con-
sequentiality, is hoped to lead to a logic of appropriateness. It is expected that over
time, social learning will take place and the democratic norms of the EU will be inter-
nalized. Despite the incremental rise in living standards (World Bank 2009: viii; and
Eurostat40 and a steady economic growth41, the Bulgarian standard of living is still the
lowest in the EU42 and there is a risk that the Bulgarian positive view of the EU will
turn into frustration and dissatisfaction. Earlier this has happened in other East Eu-
ropean countries like Poland and Slovakia (Pop-Eleches 2007:151). The Co-operation
and Verification Mechanism was installed to ensure that compliance continued after
accession and the EU has taken advantage of significant measures - e.g. freezing of
structural funds. A little surprisingly, the Bulgarian public has continued to blame
the economic hardship on the Bulgarian government rather than on the EU, perhaps
40Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=tableinit=1plugin=1language=enpcode=tsieb010
(last accessed 30.03.10)
41U.S. Department of State (27.11.09) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3236.htm (last accessed 30.03.10)
42EUROPA, Gateway to the European Union 2: http://europa.eu/abc/keyfigures/qualityoflife/wealthy/-
index_en.htmchart9 (last accessed 30.03.10)
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because of the intensive media coverage, which the corruption cases have received.
This could also indicate that some degree of socialization of EU norms and interest
has taken place - at least in the Bulgarian public.
Democracy
All political systems come with baggage and the Bulgarian baggage is particular im-
portant when analyzing why reform has been so slow or in some cases non-existent.
The most comprehensive, and undoubtedly the most important for Bulgaria’s mem-
bership of the EU, has been the democratization that has been in progress since the
fall of the Berlin Wall.
The EU has played a large role in the democratization process and, as we have already
established, the applied toll was incentive-based conditionality. Recalling agency-
centered sociological institutionalism, this may found the basis for socialization. Ma-
terial incentives may over time lead to a shift in logic; from a logic of consequentiality
to a logic of appropriateness through the mechanism of strategic calculation. To in-
duce this behavioral change, the EU has applied the principle of conditionality. But
has it worked? Can political actors, institutionalized under Communism customize to
democracy in a stable and sincere way- is it possible to teach an old dog new tricks?
The Bulgarian government has seen the promises of reward, in terms of financial aid,
geopolitical security and market opportunities to be grater than the disadvantages
of reform. Moreover, we have found that Bulgaria has fully implemented the acquis
and is thus formally living up to EU standards. Strategic calculation has taken place
but in order for a process of socialization to occur, the norms and habits also have to
change. And this has not been the case for the judiciary. No norm entrepreneurs have
emerged to initiate this process and, as we will establish later on, the veto-points have
not been overcome, in part due to the fragmented and unstable political environment.
One of the risks is that when democratic steps are taken on the grounds of for exam-
ple economic incentives, the ’value’ of the process can lose its real value. E.g. when
minorities are given rights because Bulgaria wants to show willingness towards the
EU and thereby receive financial support, then the minorities’ rights are not an end
but rather means to an end. The acceptance of such democratic norms can thus be
merely superficial and thereby undermine the proper functioning of reformed formal
institutions (Pop-Eleches 2007:150). A lack of reform of the judiciary is an obstacle to
both democratization and the market economy and if Bulgaria continues to reform
solely because they stand to lose something if they don’t, then the change can end up
without value and the Bulgarian people will not come to have faith in the government,
parliament and judiciary and no type 2 socialization, a change in values and interests,
will take place.
Judicial independence
The communist period was characterized by direct control by the political leadership
over the judiciaries. This does not mean that party members picked up the phone and
let judges know which outcome was desired in a particular case, usually this was not
necessary. Rather, it means that the judges and other members of the judiciary were
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an integral, if dependent, part of the nomenklatura and shared the belief system of
other officials. Furthermore, they saw themselves as bureaucrats and not as indepen-
dent actors (Melone 1996: 232-234). In 1991, Bulgaria adopted its constitution, which
adopted a model whereby the judicial branch was allowed a great deal of autonomy.
Constitutional judges were given functional immunity43 and jurists in ordinary courts
were essentially made irremovable44 after three years in office. The justices’ inde-
pendence was not accompanied by sufficient accountability, and gave them power to
block future reforms (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 129). The new constitution in 1991
also established the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)45, which was given the task of re-
viewing the judges from the old regime. 83 legal professionals were reviewed and 44
of these were dismissed from the judicial system. Of the 44 dismissed, 23 were judges
(about 2 pct. of the total number of Bulgarian judges), 18 were prosecutors (3.2 pct.),
and three were investigating magistrates (0.37 pct.). Moreover, 77 members of the ju-
diciary resigned voluntarily, and 243 resigned without explanation (Melone and Hays
1994: 251-252). It is difficult to speculate as to why some chose to leave the system
but some of them must have seen themselves as incompatible with the new system or
have felt that it was better to leave on their own account than risk a dismissal. Another
likely reason is the many new opportunities that came about in the private law mar-
ket. However, the vast majority of the judiciary remained in office and continued their
work under the transition period. In theoretical terms, what took place was essential
layering. Formally, the structure of the Bulgarian judiciary changed fundamentally
but endogenous change was also needed in order to try to create an unpoliticized and
independent judiciary. The actors were essentially the same but they were given new
rules to play by and the SJC was introduced to act as an overseer or referee - instead of
removing the old system and building a new from scratch, scarce resources were kept
in place and new layers added.
Early in the transition period, many jurists were concerned that the independence
of the judiciary only existed on the surface (Melone 1996:236). The incentives of the
former Communist Party to push through and implement independence in the ju-
diciary were not overwhelming. This is because in the transition period, the former
communists had the opportunity to employ money laundering and put away money
for themselves and were therefore not interested in a strong judiciary - they were in-
terested in legal chaos (Melone 1996:236).
While the judiciary may have felt political pressure to follow a specific political mind-
set (Melone 1996:236), there has not been a lack of ’fights’ between the judiciary and
43Judges enjoy the same immunity as members of the National Assembly (Constitution of Bulgari 1991: Art.
147 (6)). The term ’formal immunity’ is used due to the difficulties in conducting criminal proceedings against a
Constitutional judge. The immunity can only be revoked by the Constitutional Court upon submission of evidence
by the Attorney General as to the committing of a serious premeditated criminal offence (Ionescu 2008:1-85).
44Judges, prosecutors and investigating magistrates can only be removed from office upon: resignation; retire-
ment; serving s criminal offence, disability for more than a year or serious infringement (Constitution of Bulgaria
1991: Art. 129 (3)).
45Half of the members of the Supreme Judicial Council are members of the parliament and the other half or
magistrates, consisting of judges, prosecutors, investigators (Schönfelder 2005: 72).
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other branches of the government in the early years of transition. The picture painted
was of a powerful judiciary willing to fight for all the independence it could. One way
of controlling the judiciary, is by controlling the budgets. In 1992, the government
attempted to gain control of the budgets of the SJC and, in the extreme, dictate its
functions. This was blocked by the Constitutional Court who declared that the execu-
tive branch could not change the budget request made by the SJC without its permis-
sion. In 1995, the prosecutor general challenged a provision of the National Budget
Act claiming that it intervened with the independence of the judiciary. According to
the Act, the administrative servicing of the SJC was located in the Ministry of Justice,
and the Ministry of Finance had insisted that the SJC supplied its budget accounts to
the Ministry of Justice. Once again, the Constitutional Court stated that the executive
had no control over the budgets of the SJC (Melone 1996:238). It was, however, not
only budgetary that the executive attempted to gain control. In June 1994, the Law
on the Judiciary was passed. It contained two features affecting the judicial indepen-
dence. First of all, the law stated, that every person occupying top positions in the
judicial system, was required to have at least five years judicial experience either as a
judge or as a prosecutor. On the face of it, this should not pose a problem for those in
favor of a professional independent judiciary, as the provision ensures a high quality,
and is consistent with the notion that officials should be chosen on the basis of their
merits. The practical effect of the law, however, was that anti-Communists would be
prevented from the top positions. The only jurists with five years experience at this
time had occupied their posts during communist rule and, as mentioned earlier, the
only ones who were part of the judiciary before 1989 were party members or close as-
sociates to the nomenklatura. The second provision of the Law of the Judiciary which
was being questioned had to do specifically with the SJC. In this case five years of pro-
fessional experience as judges, prosecutors, investigation magistrates or academics
was demanded and new election for the SJC were to be held one year of the promul-
gation of the law. In this way, some of the members of the SJC could be removed.
The debate turned into open war between the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the ethnic
Turkish party, the Movement for Rights and Freedom on the one hand, and the op-
position Union of Democratic Forces on the other. The law was also criticized by the
Council of Europe. Once again, the Constitutional Court was on the judiciary’s side
and found both provisions in violation of the Constitution (Melone 1996:238-240).
The war also took place on a less theoretical level. In August 1995, the Constitutional
Court was evicted from its offices by the government. The reason given was that the
Central Electoral Committee needed more space in the building. Interestingly, mem-
bers of the Committee said that they had no need for so much space and said that the
decision was purely a political act. The President of the Constitutional Court took the
eviction as a declaration of war and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court but it
never came to a ruling. The President of Bulgaria initiated an action before the Consti-
tutional Court asking for an interpretation of an article in the Constitution, governing
the authority of the government to manage state property. Not surprisingly, the Con-
stitutional Court found that the government may not dispose of property occupied by
the President, the National Assembly, or the judiciary (Melone 1996:241).
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There were, however, also attacks from the judiciary. In 1995, a new parliament with
a socialist majority was instated. In the first nine months, six new laws were struck
down by the Court, amongst these a law requiring land owners to first offer their
property for sale to municipalities and the state before offering it to other buyers.
The Prime Minister criticized the Constitutional Court for stepping over its bound-
aries and acting like an alternative parliament (Melone 1996:240-241).
The path of the Bulgarian judicial system since 1989 is in many ways characterized
by inter-institutional conflict between the judiciary on the one side, and the executive
and legislative on the other. The Constitution is imbued by a general dissociation and
condemnation of the use of law as a political tool in the hands of party functionaries
(Melone 1996:241) - the independence of the judiciary is far-reaching and the prin-
ciple of separation of powers are protected in the Constitution. Different is it, when
it comes to checks and balances - the power may not be balanced correctly. As we
have learned by Pierson, small events in the beginning of a path can have dispropor-
tionate effects later on. Early on, the judiciary was given independence, which has
been turned out to be unchecked and not founded properly. We find that, by way
of increasing returns, asymmetrical power relations have been created between the
branches of government. The conflicts have not been resolved today. The judiciary
has many problems - it has problems with the EU, the executive, the legislative, and,
perhaps more importantly, it has problems with the people it is supposed to serve. As
we have mentioned before, judicial independence is not a privilege of the judiciary
but rather a privilege of the people.
5.4.2 The executive and the legislative - political will and short term
interests
The Bulgarian political parties have undoubtedly played an important role in the Eu-
ropeanization of Bulgaria. Political parties functions as channels for introduction of
European political standards in Bulgarian politics. They represent the Bulgarian se-
lection/supply of strategies and ideas and they function as a lobby for Bulgarian in-
terest in the EU. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the political parties can
structure the political life in Bulgaria in line with EU standards. Political parties are
not only the link between political and civil society, they are international actors who
"are an important, if not the chief, instrument for assimilation of foreign political pro-
cess" (Todorov 1999:5).
Bulgaria’s legislature consists of a one-chamber National Assembly, which has 240
members who are elected for a four-year term. The President46 is elected for a pe-
46The Bulgarian President is currently Georgi Parvanov. He got elected for his second term as president in
2006 for a period of five years (Constitution of Bulgaria: Art 93(1)). He received 64 pct. of the votes in the first
round of election and 75.9 pct. in the second, making him a clear winner against ATAKA’s leader Siderov (Spirova
2007:905 and Crombois 2008:458). The role of President Parvanov is primarily formal as the government holds the
real power in Bulgaria. He does, however retain some rights (Constitution of Bulgaria 1991: Art. 93 (2)).
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riod of five years, but his role is mainly formal. Before 2001, the political system
was dominated by two parties: the successor to the Communist Party the Bulgarian
Socialist Party (BSP) on the left, and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) on the
right. The actual decision making power in these years shifted between the two par-
ties, who took turns in having the majority in the National Assembly (Dorosiev and
Ganev 2009: 147) and politics in Bulgaria at the time was very turbulent. No fewer
than six prime ministers47 served from 1991-2001 and this political instability, cou-
pled with economic crises, created an environment of political corruption and inertia
(Baker and Baumgartl 1998:186). When the political climate is unstable and political
leaders are unsure of their future in politics and even in their own party it is almost
certain to reflect in their work (Baker and Baumgartl 1998:186). Politicians are thus
more likely to focus on the short term goals and keeping their allies content at the
expense of long term reforms. The government thereby becomes weak and without a
strong and stable government, very little reform can take place. The way of keeping
allies and favored interest groups content can be by prolonging the transition period.
In this way it becomes easier to divert public resources to certain interest groups and
political clientele (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008:115). Furthermore, in order to reform
the judicial system there needs to be a broad political will to take the necessary po-
litical steps. Amendments to the constitution can only be done through a National
Grand Assembly.
As early as in 1995, the Bulgarian politicians acknowledged the drawbacks of the par-
ticular institutional structure of the judiciary and proposed a change to the constitu-
tion. This was blocked by the UDF which then undertook a similar effort in 1997 but
was blocked by the socialists. In 2001, the former King Simeon II returned to Bulgaria
from his exile in Madrid and his party, the National Movement of Simeon II (NMSP),
won the general elections (Dorosiev and Ganev 2009: 147). This was the first time a
government lasted a full term. Profound judicial reform, however, was not a reality.
In 2002, the government of the former king Simeon II tried to reform the judiciary
and change constitutional provisions, but was blocked by both UDF and the socialist.
There seems to be a pattern of tactical short term interests prevailing over a culture of
consensus and long-term interests (Schönfelder 2005: 72). Furthermore, Schönfelder
finds that so far the problems of the judiciary have not been dealt with due to the fact
that, at least since 1993, every single government has been dependent on politicians
who had reasons to fear a change in the status quo (Schönfelder 2005: 87).
The former government, which was in power from June 2005 until 2009, was led by
socialist Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev. It took three months to stitch a coalition to-
gether among the three parties, namely the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party), the NMSP
(liberal populists led by ex-Bulgarian monarch Simeon II) and MRF (Bulgarian ethnic
Turks). This unstable coalition was subject to allegations of nepotism, lack of profes-
sionalism and corruption especially from the two populist parties ATAKA and GERB
471991 - Filip Dimitrov (UDF), 1992 - Lyuben Berov (none), 1994 - Reneta Indzhova (acting) (none), 1995 - Zhan
Videnov (BSP), 1997 - Stefan Sofiyanski (acting) (UDF), 1997 - Ivan Kostov (UDF) (Todorov 1999:34-36).
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(Andreev 2009: 378).
Today, there are eight main political parties in Bulgaria. One of them, Citizens for
European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) was set up in 2006 by the former mayor
of Sofia, Boyko Borisov. GERB won the last general election in the summer of 2009,
receiving almost 40 pct of the votes and 116 of the 240 seats in the parliament and
making Borisov prime minister. European politics is central to GERB which has an-
nounced that the government will work for economic growth, development and re-
form, as well as fight corruption and organized crime, reform the judicial system and
regain the trust of the EU48. GERB is supported by The Blue Coalition49 and ATAKA50
two right-wing populist parties. The two big opposition parties are BSP51, which have
been accused of failure to respond to instances of corruption, also with EU funds, and
MRF52 which represents ethnic Turks and Muslims and has been accused of distorting
the elections by bringing Turkish voters with a Bulgarian passport across the border
in large busses. King Simeon’s Party did not receive votes enough to gain seats. The
last party is Order, Law and Justice which is a rightist populist party that was founded
in 2006. It has received increasing support due to its leader Yane Yanev, who has been
active in supplying information to the Prosecutor’s Office about high-level fraud and
48Danish Foreign Ministry: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udenrigspolitik/Landefakta/LandefaktaEuropa/Lan-
defaktaBulgarien (last accessed 01.04.10)
49The Blue Coalition consists of several traditional right-wing parties, including the Union of Demo-
cratic Forces (UDF) which was the first democratic party to emerge after 1989. The launching of free
market reforms is mainly credited to UDF although the party has lost much support due to inter-
nal disagreements and corruption scandals (Ganev 2006:77, 81). The Blue Coalition won 15 seats at
the most recent elections and GERB sees it as its main partner. (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udenrigspolitik/Landefakta/LandefaktaEuropa/LandefaktaBulgarien (last accessed
01.04.10) and Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5640HP20090705 (last accessed 01.04.10))
50The National Union ATAKA is a nationalist party who mainly has supporters amongst the ultra right-wing.
The main topics on the agenda are to stop what ATAKA sees as an islamization of Bulgaria and corruption.
ATAKA is in strong opposition to the MRF and opposes Turkish membership of the EU and all coopera-
tion with the IMF or the World Bank. It furthermore wants Bulgaria to leave NATO. ATAKA believes Turkey
should compensate for ’genocide’ on Bulgarians during the Ottoman rule which ended in 1878 - the party
demands that Turkey pay Bulgaria 50 billion Euros. The party gained 21 seats at the last elections and is
supporting the GERB government (ATAKA: http://www.ataka.bg/en/index.php?option=comc ontent t ask =
vi ewi d = 14I temi d = 27(l ast accessed0.04.10),Dani shMi ni str yo f For ei g n A f f ai r s : ht t p :
//w w w.um.dk/d a/menu/Udenr i g spol i t i k/Lande f akt a/Lande f akt aEur opa/Lande f akt aBul g ar i en-
(l ast accessed01.04.10), andReuter s : ht t p : //w w w.r euter s.com/ar ti cle/i dU ST RE5640HP20090705-
(l ast accessed01.04.10).
51Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is the successor to the Communist Party and has previously been in govern-
ment with the ethnic Turkish party, MRF, and NMSP. It was under the BSP, MRF and NMSP coalition that Bul-
garia entered the EU, decreased the corporate and income taxes to 10 pct. and administered the economic boom.
The term was, however, tarnished by a lack of sustainable development which has now, combined with the in-
ternational economic crisis, throwing Bulgaria into a recession. Furthermore, accusations of failure to respond
to instances of corruption, also with EU funds, have hurt the party’s reputation as well as an incapability to put
through the reforms required by the EU. The BSP currently hold 40 seats in the National Assembly and are part of
the opposition along with the MRF (ibid).
52 Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) is a liberal party and the political representation of the Bul-
garian ethnic Turks and other Muslims who make up about 10 pct. of the Bulgarian population. The
role of the party is mainly to tip the scales in the many instances of indecisiveness (Crombois 2008:459).
The MRF has been accused of distorting the elections by bringing Turkish voters with a Bulgarian pass-
port across the border. It currently holds 38 seats in the National Assembly (Danish Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Udenrigspolitik/Landefakta/LandefaktaEuropa/LandefaktaBulgarien (last ac-
cessed 01.04.10) and Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5640HP20090705 (last accessed 01.04.10)).
Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5640HP20090705 (last accessed 01.04.10)
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theft53. The party currently holds 10 seats in the National Assembly. GERB’s biggest
supporting party ATAKA is openly against Bulgaria’s membership of the EU. It is clear
by the actual political landscape that the unstable political climate and nature indeed
continues to limit the potential for reform initiatives of the Bulgarian judiciary.
After winning the 2009 elections, the new government led by Prime Minister Borisov
set out to fulfill on its declarations of cracking down on organized crime and the prob-
lems of the judiciary. Interestingly enough, at the end of January 2010, Borisov and
the top Bulgarian magistrates made a deal, which they called a gentlemen’s agree-
ment, which was a promise to avoid inter-institutional conflict, respect one another’s
institutions and other such phrases. Basically, it was a toning down of the Prime Min-
ister’s former criticism of the judiciary and a signal that judges pledged to "clean their
own houses" (Novinite 03.05.10). This adds an important concern to the actual will
of the executive’s intention to reform the judiciary. Despite this agreement between
the Prime Minister and the supreme magistrates, the Interior Minister Tsvetanov crit-
icized the courts strongly in February 2010 after the release of suspects arrested af-
ter a large scale operation by police on organized crime. The reaction to Tsvetanov’s
criticism came from the head of the Supreme Court of Cassation, Lazar Gruev, who
together with his colleges sent an open letter to the Prime Minister protesting against
the Interior Minister’s remarks, and threatening to tell on the government "to all Euro-
pean and international magistrates’ organizations one could ever imagine" (Novinite
03.05.10).
The electorate system
One pending structural challenge is the reform of the electorate system in Bulgaria.
The country uses proportional representation to elect their national and local assem-
blies. Serious accusations of vote buying have surfaced in the past, especially con-
cerning vulnerable social groups and the Roma. Non-resident Turkish and Mace-
donian citizens holding dual nationality have been organized by different parties to
come to vote during elections, determining the results in some border districts. Adding
the many mistrustful and alienated voters which do not vote, as well as many who
have emigrated out of the country, it provides an electorate advantage to the relatively
more mobilized radical populists, ethnic and former communists voters. Bulgarian
politicians have been considering different changes of the electorate law, e.g. intro-
ducing obligatory voting or even transforming the system to a more majoritarian one
(Andreev 2009: 380). This could provide more political coherence making it easier to
create reforms, but will remain to be seen.
Bureaucracy - Public Administration
Bulgarian bureaucracy is highly politicized, which can be seen by the fact that after ev-
ery change of government, thousands of officials are dismissed because of their party
affiliation (Schönfelder 2005: 87). The constitution of 1991 provided no provisions to
ensure the setup of an independent competent and functioning civil service, and no
53Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5640HP20090705 (last accessed 01.04.10)
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legislative action was taken in that direction (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 128). Pub-
lic administration is an area where the EU has no acquis that can be applied by mem-
ber states. But as early as 1995, the EU formulated the requirement of an independent,
efficient, and functional civil service as part of the Copenhagen criteria, and reforms
in the public administration where singled out as a prerequisite for launching mem-
bership negotiations (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 130). In 1998, Bulgaria adopted
the Law of Administration followed by new laws on civil service in 1999, determining
the allocation of powers across the levels of agencies in the executive, shielding pub-
lic servants from political pressure and providing more transparent procedures and
standards on recruitment and progress on the career ladder. This was done by the
UDF centre-right government which enjoyed a solid majority. King Simeon, prime
minister from 2001 to 2005, appointed a minister without portfolio responsible for
state administration, and set up a special ministry to deal with these matters. But
there is serious doubt whether these top-down measures have had an impact. Insuf-
ficient openness and efficiency as well as civil servants qualifications still prove to be
a big problem. A reason for this is that both governments have failed to provide the
adequate financial and human resources to back up their initiatives (Noutcheva and
Bechev 2008: 131-132). Furthermore, the insufficient investigation and prosecution
of cases of corruption amongst public office holders show little conviction to tackle
the problems (Bozhilova 2007: 296).
Corruption
Bulgaria has developed an anti-corruption strategy since 2001, and has established
accompanying agencies to administer its implementation. These consist of an Anti-
corruption agency with the Council of Ministers, a PHARE funded project combat-
ing corruption with the Ministry of Interior, a permanent parliamentary committee to
combat corruption, and hotlines in key ministries and in the Supreme Judicial Coun-
cil. Summed up, both the necessary institutional and normative framework has been
put in place, but the evaluation of the effectiveness of its working has shown poor re-
sults. This can be explained in two ways, first the actors lack the necessary ability to
operate the new structures and norms, or the national veto players have captured the
new institutional structures placed under their supervision (Bozhilova 2007:298).
An interesting figure is the fact that though the number of registered offences in cases
of corruption have increased over the years, surprisingly the number of convictions
have fallen. This appears more likely to indicate a lack of enforcement of JHA reforms
and indicates cases of corruption (Bozhilova 2007:301).
New institutions have been created both in the area of corruption and public admin-
istration but whether these will provide possibilities of change through layering over
time is impossible to foresee. The risk is that these may simply be empty institutions
governed by the same actors that constitute the old institutions.
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 77
5.4.3 Judicial independence and reforms
As presented earlier, Bulgaria has one of the most independent judicial systems in
East Central Europe and the Balkan (Schönfelder 2005). In spite of this achievement,
the judiciary performance is still lacking behind, resulting in a majority of Bulgarians
preferring to avoid lawyers and courts, as they are viewed as unreliable, inefficient
and corrupt. The actual independence of the Bulgarian judiciary might be excessive
and inhibit the reform of the judiciary, but also the special role of prosecutors plays
an important role in the functioning on the judiciary.
In practice, neither Parliament nor the Executive has any means to perform scrutiny
of the SJC (Bozhilova 2007: 291). As presented in the misfit analysis (chapter 5.2), the
SJC performs a supervisory role and presents an annual report to Parliament on the
functioning of the judiciary, which in principle should help ensure accountability of
the SJC to the public (Bozhilova 2007: 291). But instead of performing a supervising
role, the parliamentary quota of the SJC (12 out of 25 members), is most often sus-
pected as the locus for executive and legislative influence of the judiciary.
Proposals for significant changes in the judicial and governance structure of the ju-
diciary, which encompassed the sharing of legislative and administrative powers be-
tween the Ministry of Justice and the SJC, were first discussed in 2001 and 2002, but
were rejected by the Constitutional Court (as the earlier mentioned attempts in the
1990s) on the grounds that any change in governance structure could only be intro-
duced by a Grand National Assembly54. A way to bypass this was found by the Par-
liament committee, and the amendments were adopted in 2003. This could be seen
as one of the big steps of the reform of the judiciary, but the Constitutional Court has
refused to accept the legality of these changes (Bozhilova 2007: 292).
When it comes to the institutional practices and separation of powers between the
executive and the judiciary the Commission does not prescribe a single model, since
the EU member states themselves show great diversity. The fast harmonization of EU
law produced numerous pieces of legislation which courts, lawyers, regulatory bod-
ies and others in charge of implementation have had difficulty in understanding, ap-
plying and enforcing it creating an implementation gap55. In 2003, after prosecutor
general Nikola Filchev had initiated an appeal in order to stop the reform of shifting
the investigation service from the judiciary to the executive, the Constitutional Court
once again ruled that it would require special elections in the Grand National Assem-
bly outside the normal political cycle, thus making it an impossible political project.
This decision was changed in 2005 when it became clear that the EU might delay ac-
cession by one year for Bulgaria’s failure to reform the judiciary; the Constitutional
Court ruled that an ordinary Parliament could introduce changes in the judicial sys-
54This requires new parliamentary elections to set up parliament extraordinaire that should first amend the
Constitution and, second vote on the proposed new law (Bozhilova 2007: 292).
55World Bank: http://www.worldbank.bg/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/BULGARIAEXTN/0„ -
contentMDK:20149551 menuPK:305446 pagePK:141137 piPK:141127 theSitePK:305439,00.html (last accessed
29.03.10)
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tem, thus paving the way through for what ended as an adoption of the new Penal
Procedure Code in October 2005 (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 134).
What becomes clear is that the low level of political commitment to reform, the un-
stable political environment and the great power of the judiciary has not resulted in
fundamental reform. It seem to be up to the judiciary to reform itself. We will now
turn to a deeper understanding of the inefficiencies of the judiciary and the veto play-
ers and institutional landscape that are under scrutiny to reform.
5.4.4 Reform of the judiciary - inefficiencies and immunity
An important feature of the constitutional provisions is the life tenure and immunity
for judges and the self administrative construction, where the SJC appoints judges
and is also in charge of enforcing discipline. The reason for judges having immunity
in Bulgaria is due to the frequent cases of purposeful prosecution on the basis of fab-
ricated evidence and that this would result in persecution of disobedient judges. But
immunity has also had negative consequences as there have been cases were judges
have been connected to crime, but have not been persecuted. This has resulted in a
negative public image of judges and low trust (Schönfelder 2005:74).
Structural reforms have been necessary and the first initiative was made in 2003, when
the Constitution was amended in order to limit the scope of magistrate’s immunity by
increasing the Supreme Courts ability to dismiss magistrates in cases of professional
misconduct and involvement in criminal activity (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008: 133).
Until 2005, and the adoption of a new Penal Procedure Code, the three entities of
the judiciary, namely judges, prosecutors and investigators, enjoyed functional im-
munity against criminal proceedings. Following the adoption, functional immunity
does no longer cover investigators, and this part has been removed from the judiciary
to the executive branch of government, to create more accountability (Bozhilova 2007:
291). Furthermore, after five years in office and a positive professional track-record,
the magistrates become immovable following an authorization of the SJC (Bozhilova
2007: 292). Calls from the legislature to impose partial or full limitation on prosecu-
tor’s immunity in criminal proceedings have been met with resistance from all sides
of the judiciary encompassing both judges and prosecutors. The former may have
sensed that an infringement on the powers of prosecutors might in the end lead to an
infringement on their own powers (Bozhilova 2007:297). In addition, the work of the
court has become more transparent due to the creation of two new positions, namely
a court administrator to organize courts, and a court assistant to aid judges in the
preparation of cases and the drafting of decisions. In spite of the reforms of the pre-
trial phase, the prosecutors and investigators’ work, as well of the dealings of the SJC,
still remain non-transparent with almost no information concerning their proceed-
ings (Bozhilova 2007: 292). Furthermore, there is no system for assessing performance
in the judiciary, and promotion is not transparent and depends mostly on the sitting
chairman of the court. This may result in less than highly competent figures to the
Supreme Courts (Schönfelder 2005: 75-76).
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A legacy of the Communist era is the severe hierarchical structure in the judiciary
as well as the unique role of the prosecutor in the judicial. Prosecutors in the Soviet
Union were seen as watchdogs overseeing society. Prosecutors in Bulgaria not only file
and argue suits against criminals but they are involved in administrative procedures
as well as constitutional and civil litigation (Schönfelder 2005: 70). When a Bulgar-
ian citizen feels treated unjustly by the public administration a preferred remedy is to
complain to the prosecutor, which issues a protest and instructs the public adminis-
tration to change its decision and in last instance files a suit. Prosecutors hold firm
control over police investigations and can for example instruct the police to stop in-
vestigating a case (Schönfelder 2005: 70-71).
When it comes to the judges’ freedom to decide according to their understanding of
the law, they are in a less secure position due to several reasons. Political interfer-
ence occurs in different manners, politicians executing pressure through telephone
calls, parties arranging ex parte56 discussions or even threats of violence (Schönfelder
2005: 65). The great powers of the prosecutor, combined with the fear of judges fac-
ing nontransparent and unfair disciplinary procedures if charges happen to be raised
against them, foster excessive solidarity with prosecutors (Schönfelder 2005: 65). Fur-
thermore, judges tend to turn a blind eye if they witness prosecution violation of dis-
cipline (Schönfelder 2005: 72).
The hierarchical structure of the prosecution was upheld by a ruling of the Consti-
tutional Court from January 2006, which refused to interpret the powers of the Chief
Public Prosecutor proceeding from the Constitutional text. This left the Chief Public
Prosecutors without clear boundaries and limitations, preserving a top-down struc-
ture of the prosecution, even though it is opaque and conducive to corruptive prac-
tice. As it is, the prosecutors are not accountable to any one person or body, except to
the Chief Public Prosecutor (Bozhilova 2007:296-297).
All in all, these conditions create three problems, they create conflicts of interest within
the judiciary, they promote passivity to the public and preserve the statist inclinations
characterizing the legal procedure in Bulgaria. The latter is mainly due to the overload
of work for prosecutors and judges stemming from the particular structure of the le-
gal system, and the limited resources and insufficient capacity available. Resolving a
civil case frequently takes from three to eight years. This is both due to work overload
stemming from a big amount of appeals, as well as an underfunding of the judiciary
(Schönfelder 2005:71).
5.4.5 Preliminary Conclusion
What becomes clear from the analysis is that it is short term self interests, which dom-
inates the development of the judiciary and political landscape. An unstable political
56Refers to a situation in which only one party (and not the adversary) appears before a judge (The Lectric Law
Library’s Lexicon).
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environment, characterized by a culture of conflict rather than consensus, lacks the
will to reform the judiciary. Furthermore, the strong independence of the judiciary is
upheld by veto players, mainly the Constitutional Court and the SCJ, who resist reform
by complicating procedures or simply refusing to accept amendments. The potential
of self reform does not seem to be in place. The complex relation of the judges and
prosecutors fosters a culture of recrimination rather than cooperation. The lack of
transparency and immunity creates low accountability and incentives for corruption,
which makes it costly and not feasible for judges and prosecutors to reform the judi-
ciary.
Furthermore, new institutions and policies such the Anti-Corruption Strategy, the Min-
istry for the Functioning of the Public Administration, and the monitoring role of
the SJC created to tackle problems of corruption, have either not received the nec-
essary resources or simply been absorbed by the existing institutional structure and
veto players, thus leading to insignificant empowerment of potential reform minded
actors, and no substantial reform but merely ad hoc pro forma reform to satisfy EU
demands.
We can conclude that when it comes to the reform of the judiciary few effects of ab-
sorption through adaptation have occurred, rather mostly through a process of ac-
commodation. The fact that a number of judicial reforms have been adopted but not
implemented shows that the EU policy effect has not yet settled into the operational
logic of domestic actors. This indicates that no fundamental change in the logic of
norms and values has taken place, but everything is business as usual. Inertia has
been the characteristic of the judiciary due to the existence of non-accountable gov-
ernance structures, as well as a number of veto players in key implementations po-
sitions, which will not benefit from increased transparency and compliance resulting
from effective and efficient policy implementation.
6Conclusions and critical reflections
This thesis has aimed at answering the reasons behind the lack of judicial reform in
Bulgaria. Through a case study and by applying a top down approach of Europeaniza-
tion theory combined with new institutionalism, we have sought to answer the follow-
ing research question;
"Why has Bulgaria not been able to live up to the EUs accession criteria? "
We have found that there are several indicators for the lack of reform originating both
from the EU and Bulgaria. We will present these and discuss the usefulness of our
theoretical concepts and to what extent our choice of data has helped us in applying
these. Furthermore, we will discuss the methodological and theoretical choices we
have made throughout the thesis and the implications these have had on our conclu-
sions.
6.1 Conclusions
By introducing safeguard measures in the Accession Treaty the EU extended its con-
ditionality instrument to the post accession period. The EU had the option of sus-
pending some of the rights under the acquis, e.g. withhold funds, but this approach
has proven to have its limitations. We have found that the safeguard clauses do not
have any correlation to capacity building and are in essence measures of negative in-
tegration. The EU has and does provide some resources for reform of the judiciary but
these are not deemed sufficient and are, furthermore, poorly managed. This, viewed
in the light of policy reform taking precedence over institutional reform, and the vague
and generalizing nature of the benchmarks and the best practice instrument, may
render the task of reducing the number of veto players in the judiciary unfruitful. Poor
and unstructured funds, unclear benchmarks as well as a limited number of measures
to hinder non-compliance or circumvention, may thus be part of the reason why Bul-
garia has not been able to carry through judicial reform.
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By analyzing three different forms of misfit, we have discovered in which areas there is
lack of reform and thus divergence from required EU standards. We have found that
there are no shortcomings in the transposition of the Community laws, as Bulgaria
has transposed all of the acquis communitaire. Rather, we have found that the issues,
which call for a closer review, involve the organizational structure and the culture of
the judiciary. Since 1989, Bulgaria has gone through a process of democratization
including the establishment of a system of separation of powers, and resulting from
this, the judiciary has received independence from the other branches of the State.
The problem is that the judicial independence is not being checked and balanced.
This is because the established body to monitor the judiciary, the Inspectorate to the
Supreme Judicial Council, has not been willing to enforce recommendations designed
to increase accountability. The problem is that the SJC is the only body that is able to
check that investigations, court procedures and rulings are proper and according to
the books, and if the SJC does not function towards this end, then the judiciary has no
one to answer to. In a trias politica system the powers of the state branches are bal-
anced. In Bulgaria, the powers are not balanced, they are asymmetrical - the judiciary
enjoys too much independence. This is a problem because too much independence
opens up to problems of corruption and impunity, and we find that corruption is a
reoccurring problem in the Bulgarian judiciary. Commission reports, as well as Trans-
parency International reports, find high levels of corruption in the Bulgarian judiciary.
Many media stories of bribery and delayed trials have created a perception of a cul-
ture of corruption amongst the jurists, who are mistrusted by the public - the judiciary
is perceived to be the most corrupt sector. We thus find that there are both organiza-
tional and cultural problems insufficiencies in the judiciary, which need to be dealt
with in order to live up to EU criteria.
But why have the problems of the judiciary not been dealt with?
The communist legacy left a more or less intact but very independent judiciary - only
a small part of the magistrates where replaced. The advantage of this was that Bulgaria
kept a major resource, but the disadvantage was the danger of awarding increased in-
dependence, and thereby power, to people who had been part of the previous system.
This system created an asymmetrical relationship laying the foundations to a conflict
ridden relationship between the judiciary and the executive and legislative.
The troublesome relationship still exists today between the judiciary and the other
state branches. There have been initiatives to reform and new institutions and poli-
cies, such the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, the Ministry for the Functioning of
the Public Administration, and the monitoring role of the SJC have been created to
tackle problems of corruption. But we have found that these have either not received
the necessary resources or simply been absorbed by the existing institutional struc-
ture and veto players. Any attempt of curbing the independence of the judiciary is
stricken down by the Constitutional Court. Another obstacle lies in the unstable po-
litical environment. Frequently changing governments and a conflicting political en-
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vironment has undermined long term reforms and weakened the executive and the
legislature. Combined with a fully independent judiciary enjoying immunity and up-
held by veto players, mainly the Constitutional Court and the SJC, which resists reform
by complicating procedures or simply refusing to accept amendments, progressive re-
form is not generated. Furthermore, the judiciary does not seem to hold the potential
for self reform because of an environment of conflicts inside the judiciary between
the magistrates over powers and mutual corruption allegations, which are not easily
uncovered due to the immunity status of judges and prosecutors.
Summing up; the fact that a number of judicial reforms have been initiated but not
lead to pervasive reform, tells us that the EU policy effect has not yet settled into the
operational logic of domestic actors. This indicates that no fundamental change in
the logic of norms and values has taken place, but everything is ’business as usual’. We
find that no substantial reform but merely ad hoc pro forma reform to satisfy EU de-
mands has taken place. There have been few effects of absorption where some insti-
tutions have been accommodated but no paradigm shift and thus no transformation
has taken place. Inertia has been the main characteristic of the judiciary’s response
to reform demands, due to the existence of non-accountable governance structures,
as well as a number of veto players in key implementation positions, who will not
benefit, from increased transparency and compliance resulting from effective and ef-
ficient policy implementation. Instead they stand to lose power and influence. The
time frame of reform is relatively constrained considering the parallel democratiza-
tion of the state. Second, the EU resources focusing on the rule of law have been few
and badly managed, focusing on policy over institutional reform. This strategy has
failed to reduce the high number of veto players in the judiciary. Due to the absence
of measures to preclude non compliance other than the safety clauses, veto players,
both in the judiciary as well as the legislative, seem to have been empowered on the
expense of the public society which favors European integration.
6.1.1 Critical Reflections
Theoretical concepts
As discussed in our theoretical chapter, some argue that the level of misfit itself has
explanatory value in the domestic response to EU pressure. We have not found the
concept useful for this purpose. First of all, it is difficult to determine the different
levels of misfit and second, it is difficult to see how this concept can determine the
amount of pressure generated. We believe that the concept of conditionality is better
suited for this. The concept of conditionality does, however, have some weaknesses
when it comes to determining which actors the EU pressure affects, and the underly-
ing mechanisms of how the pressure exerted is are not clear enough, thus limiting the
analysis on the effect of EU pressure. An inherent problem when utilizing concepts
as veto players and differential empowerment of actors occurs when we want to mea-
sure who are the winners and losers from policy and institutional change, stemming
from European membership and pressure. This implies that we need to analyze the
difference in policy substance, institutional setup, and political behavior before and
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after a specific EU pressure has commenced. This is almost impossible, as one cannot
speak of a specific moment in time when EU pressure commenced, and second, the
intertwined political system makes it difficult to detect what causes what. The sec-
ond criticism of our theoretical concepts concerns our agency centered approach to
socialization mechanisms. We found that a problem arises when addressing the de-
pendent variable in clarifying who becomes socialized, is it states, corporate actors
or individuals? And how do we establish connections pointing to a correlation; that
changes in individual identity precede later shifts in policy and that these are con-
sistent with them. Thirdly, we chose to include concepts such as displacement and
layering in order to account for endogenous change not observable through our other
theoretical concepts. The latter did not provide the explanatory value we had hoped,
mainly due to our selection of data, which because of the scope of our case study did
not operate at a sufficient micro level to allow for observations suitable for these con-
cepts.
Case data
There are several implications concerning the choice of the Bulgarian judiciary as our
case. Even though the transition started over 20 years ago, Bulgaria has only been a
full member of the EU for little more than three years. Judicial reform is a major in-
tervention in the polity of a country and it would be naïve of us to think that such
major transformation can take place over night. Whether EU pressure will have a pro-
found effect may be too early to assess at this point. Furthermore, research is still
limited due to the recent accession and limited resources in Bulgaria, and many na-
tional documents and homepages are still not translated into English, this has partly
limited our access to information - a way to overcome this could have been to con-
duct informant or expert interviews both on national and EU level.
When selecting empirical data it is important to be aware of an eventual bias. Our
empirical data can overall be grouped into three categories; official EU data, research
articles and news articles. Official EU documents tend to have a diplomatic approach
to issues and may downplay the severity of the shortcomings in the judiciary. The
research articles we have chosen all have the same theoretical orientation as this the-
sis, namely a new institutional theoretical approach, which, as discussed later has an
inherent focus on stability. Finally, newspaper articles have the primary purpose of
selling newspapers and tend to embellish and perhaps exaggerate the scope of the
problem. Despite the many differences in biases and approaches, interestingly there
seems to be congruence in their assessment of the development and remaining issues
in Bulgaria, thus supplying validity to our conclusions.
The institutional approach
There are certain limitations to an institutional approach; one of the problems is the
difficulty of measuring institutions. We are aware that they exist, but how do they
vary? Second, explanations available from institutional theory may be excessively
static and not be able to cope with the dynamics of our case (Peters 2000: 22). Even
though we have attempted to incorporate concepts, which capture a potential for
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change, our theoretical approach operates at an analytical level, which might miss
potential reform-friendly ideas or discourses in the legislative and the judiciary. This
may result in us missing developments indicating favorable change in interests and
norms. The positive effect of employing the three schools of institutionalism is that
the explanatory power of the three theories is in play and provides different perspec-
tives on the empirics. We believe that this has brought strength to our conclusions,
as we have created a broad and nuanced picture of our case. We have been able to
include both agency and structure and found valuable reasons for the lack of reform
in both the judiciary and the environment in which it operates.
We have chosen a "double interpretation" method, meaning that we have used the
same empirics and interpreted them both from a constructivist perspective and ratio-
nal choice perspective. We find that a weakness might be that some concepts from the
theories may not come optimally into play as they are better suited for analyzing dif-
ferent data at a different analytical level. Concepts from sociological institutionalism
such as persuasion and isomorphism, which already are difficult to apply on an op-
erational level, do not come into play, the latter working better with more discursive
empirics and the former in cases where the interplay between specific institutions is
much more in focus. Combining these circumstances with our emphasis on strate-
gic calculation as a mechanism leading to socialization, we have tilted the balance
towards giving rational choice intuitionalist explanations more importance at the ex-
pense of sociological institutionalism.
Methodological alternatives
In our methodology we discussed the weakness that Europeanization theory has in
ascribing reform in Bulgaria as a result of EU pressure. Our thesis, and the research
articles utilized, suffer from an exclusive focus on EU cases and tend to be biased to-
wards EU-level explanations. We could have chosen to apply the method of process
tracing to create more proximity between our theory and our data. Process tracing is
widely used in studies of International Relations and European Politics. The reasons
for this is that it can be a useful tool when building bridges between different theoret-
ical tool kits and can help scholars avoid correlation arguments and reasoning based
on ’as’ and ’if’. Process tracing can also tackle some of the problems of theoretical
bias - a scholars ’favorite’ theory has so-called ’first mover advantages’ (Checkel 2005:
14-16).
A comparative study with another country, instead of a single case-study, could have
added more validity to our thesis. By examining whether for example Romania has
responded differently due to a more favorable domestic situation than Bulgaria, we
would have been able to add further validity to our claim that mediating domestic
factors are in great deal responsible for the inertia towards reform in Bulgaria.
When analyzing the EU pressure on Bulgaria it becomes clear that what on first im-
pression is a clear case of vertical Europeanization, through a vertical chain of com-
mand from the EU to Bulgaria, has some horizontal consequences. The instruments
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used by the EU resemble instruments of negative integration, wanting to remove ob-
structions and problems in the judiciary through the instrument of best practice, rather
than clear rules and regulations ready for implementation, typical for cases of pos-
itive integration. This has implications for our use of the concept of misfit and our
top-down approach. A top-down approach and the concept of misfit are more valid
with a vertical chain of command where there are clear EU requirements and existing
national polity and policies in the given area. In this case, EU requirements are vague
and the choice of policies and the implementation of these are up to the Bulgarians.
Thus, an Europeanization approach focusing more on the horizontal mechanisms
might have been able to capture some of the dynamics of the interstate relations by
examining policy transfer through learning and assimilation of other member states
policies. Furthermore, by not including the horizontal approach we may be overlook-
ing influences coming from other interest groups in society, for example businesses,
which may have supplied extra dimensions or nuances to our conclusions.
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